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SEARCHING FOR EQUITY AMID A SYSTEM 
OF SCHOOLS: THE VIEW FROM NEW 
ORLEANS 
Robert Garda* 
ABSTRACT 
Hurricane Katrina leveled both the buildings and governance 
structure of the New Orleans school system.  The system was 
transformed from one elected school board controlling nearly all the 
schools to a system of schools with sixty-three school districts 
operating within the city’s geographic boundaries that are run by 
forty-four independent school boards.  There is not a more 
decentralized school governance structure in the United States.  This 
Article discusses how this new system of schools is attempting to 
achieve equal educational opportunities for its most vulnerable and 
at-risk student populations: the poor, minorities, students with 
disabilities, and English Language Learners. 
For the first seven years after Katrina, the system of schools 
operated with virtually no centralized planning or unified services, 
instead pushing all decision-making and service provision down to the 
autonomous schools.  With little oversight, the schools became 
balkanized by race, class, and ability because of unequal access, 
retention, and service provision, and because certain schools are 
specialized for discrete student populations.  It became apparent that 
centralizing certain services and unifying policies was essential to 
creating equal opportunities for vulnerable students, which slowly 
began occurring in 2012. 
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Today, New Orleans education stands at a crossroads in deciding 
how to achieve equity for its vulnerable student populations.  One 
route relies on centralizing services, planning, and oversight to ensure 
that every school provides an appropriate education to any type of 
student that walks through the schoolhouse door.  This path embraces 
the version of inclusion equality set forth in Brown v. Board of 
Education: “separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”  
The other route relies on the market driven reform underlying the 
charter movement to create specialized schools to fill the unmet 
demands of vulnerable populations.  This route embraces an 
emerging view of equality—where separate can be equal, possibly 
even superior, if parents are empowered to maximize their child’s 
academic outcomes in specialized settings.  This Article argues that 
New Orleans is headed down this latter route and identifies the 
lessons that can be learned from its evolution to a system of schools. 
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INTRODUCTION 
New Orleans has been the epicenter of education reform since 
Hurricane Katrina decimated the city and its schools in August of 
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2005.1  In the storm’s aftermath, New Orleans schools were remade 
based on the education reforms of the day: charter schools, choice, 
and state takeover of failing schools.  The Recovery School District 
(RSD), an arm of the state Department of Education, wrested control 
of over ninety percent of the schools from the Orleans Parish School 
Board (OPSB) and chartered these schools to private operators over 
the course of the next nine years.  In the 2014–15 school year, the 
RSD became the first district in the United States to have one 
hundred percent charter schools.2  With seventy-four charter schools, 
sixty-seven private schools, and only six traditional schools run 
directly by an elected school board, New Orleans is “reinventing itself 
as a decentralized system of schools.”3 
The changes in New Orleans are called a “grand experiment in 
urban education for the nation”4 that could “shake the foundation of 
American education.”5  While the reforms are touted as a “roadmap” 
and a “model” for other cities to follow,6 and many are in fact 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Walter Isaacson, The Greatest Educational Lab, TIME, Sept. 17, 2007, at 47; 
Patrik Jonsson, As New Orleans Restarts its Schools, Most are Now Charter Schools, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 4, 2007, at 1 (positing that New Orleans is the 
“proving ground” for charter schools); Lesli A. Maxwell, City Yearns for Rebirth 
Among Ruin, EDUC. WK. (Aug. 14, 2007), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2007/
08/15/45nolaoverview.h26.html (explaining that the efforts to rebuild New Orleans’s 
education system is “one of the nation’s most important education stories”). 
 2. PATRICK SIMS & DEBRA VAUGHAN, THE COWEN INST., THE STATE OF PUBLIC 
EDUCATION IN NEW ORLEANS 2014 REPORT 8 (2014) [hereinafter THE COWEN INST., 
2014 REPORT], available at http://www.speno2014.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/
SPENO-Small.pdf; Kari Dequine Harden, New Orleans Nearing a ‘Privatized’ Public 
School System, LA. WKLY. (June 2, 2014), http://www.louisianaweekly.com/new-
orleans-nearing-a-privatized-public-school-system/ (stating that RSD is the nation’s 
first “completely privatized school system”); Lyndsey Layton, In New Orleans, Major 
School District Closes Traditional Public Schools for Good, WASH. POST, May 28, 
2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/in-new-orleans-traditional-
public-schools-close-for-good/2014/05/28/ae4f5724-e5de-11e3-8f90-73e071f3d637_
story.html. 
 3. John Ayers, Introduction to THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2; 
Anya Kamenetz, The End of Neighborhood Schools, NPR.ORG (Sept. 2, 2014), 
http://apps.npr.org/the-end-of-neighborhood-schools/; see also Dawn Ruth, Amazing 
Recovery: Incredibly, a Model School System, NEW ORLEANS MAG., Aug. 2014, 
http://www.myneworleans.com/New-Orleans-Magazine/August-2014/Amazing-
Recovery/ (explaining that the centralized school system in New Orleans is finished). 
 4. Layton, supra note 2. 
 5. DAVID OSBORNE, THIRD WAY, BORN ON THE BAYOU: A NEW MODEL FOR 
AMERICAN EDUCATION 2 (2012), available at http://content.thirdway.org/publications
/579/Third_Way_Report_-_Born_on_the_Bayou-A_New_Model_for_American_
Education.pdf. 
 6. Id.; Jeff Bryant, Look out, Chris Christie: The New War on Public Schools 
Just Might Be Defeated, SALON (June 3, 2014), http://www.salon.com/2014/06/03/
look_out_chris_christie_the_new_war_on_public_schools_just_might_be_defeated/ 
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emulating the reforms,7 the critical question is whether they are 
working. 
In the modern-day accountability era, test scores and graduation 
rates are the primary measures by which to answer this question.  
Debate rages over whether the new system of schools in New Orleans 
has actually improved student academic gains.  The state and charter 
proponents tout the growth rate of positive indicators for students 
and schools since Katrina,8 while opponents point to low benchmark 
performance,9 data showing there has been no growth,10 the 
                                                                                                                 
(noting that think tanks on both sides of the political spectrum have touted the New 
Orleans model as “what should come next” in school reform). 
 7. See Ayers, supra note 3 (explaining that many districts are beginning to try 
decentralization and a “mutilayered governance model”); Danielle Dreilinger, 
Success of Recovery School District Considered at National Conference, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, July 28, 2014, http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/07/challenge_
of_recovery_school_d.html (showing that Michigan and Tennessee state takeover 
districts are modeled on RSD); Ingrid Jacques, Column: A New Orleans Model for 
Detroit?, DETROIT NEWS (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/opinion/
editorials/2014/08/29/column-a-new-orleans-model-for-detroit/14817041/ (establishing 
New Orleans as a potential model for Detroit); OSBORNE, supra note 5, at 23. 
 8. See, e.g., THE COWEN INST., NOLA BY THE NUMBERS: SCHOOL ENROLLMENT 
AND DEMOGRAPHICS FROM OCT. 2013, at 1 (2014) [hereinafter THE COWEN INST., 
NOLA BY THE NUMBERS] (showing that the number of students in D or F schools 
decreased from 23% in the 2012–2013 school year to 14% in the 2013–2014 school 
year); Peter Cook, When All Else Fails File a Civil Rights Complaint, PE+CO (July 
8, 2014), http://peterccook.com/2014/07/08/when-all-else-fails/ (highlighting that 
student performance in New Orleans is improving at a much faster rate than in the 
rest of the state); Danielle Dreilinger, John White: New Orleans Charter Civil Rights 
Complaint ‘a Joke’, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 15, 2014, http://www.nola.com/education/
index.ssf/2014/05/john_white_new_orleans_charter.html [hereinafter Dreilinger, New 
Orleans Charter Civil Rights Complaint ‘a Joke’] (explaining that before Katrina, 
35% of students attended nonfailing schools, and now that figure is at 92%); Danielle 
Dreilinger, New Orleans High School Exam Results, Graduation Rate Near State 
Average, TIMES-PICAYUNE, July 11, 2014, http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/
2014/07/new_orleans_high_school_exam_r.html [hereinafter Dreilinger, New Orleans 
High School Exam Results] (reporting that student performance on end of course 
exams in New Orleans was approaching the state average); Kamenetz, supra note 3 
(“[T]he city has posted the largest, fastest improvement in test scores ever produced 
in an urban public school system.”); Layton, supra note 2 (explaining that in 2007, 
only 23% of students tested at grade level in math, but in 2013 that percentage rose 
to 57%, and before Katrina the graduation rate was 54.4%, but in 2013 the 
graduation was 77.6%); OSBORNE, supra note 5 (noting that RSD schools have 
improved faster than any other schools in the state). 
 9. See, e.g., THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 20 (noting that 
performance lags behind most other school districts); Harden, supra note 2 (pointing 
out that the average ACT score of students in RSD schools is not good enough to get 
into any Louisiana four year college, and is well below the state average; and noting 
that only four Louisiana school districts had a lower ACT average than the RSD). 
 10. See, e.g., Jeff Bryant, The Truth About the New Orleans School Reform 
Model, EDUC. OPPORTUNITY NETWORK (Aug. 6, 2014), http://educationopportunity
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manipulation of state standards and data that create an illusion of 
improvement,11 and the plateauing of student and school academic 
gains.12  Both sides are correct: schools in New Orleans steadily 
improved after Katrina, but the district as a whole remains one of the 
lowest performing districts in one of the lowest performing states in 
the nation.13  Charter advocates emphasize the stronger performance 
                                                                                                                 
network.org/the-dishonest-case-for-the-new-orleans-school-reform-model/ (noting 
that RSD schools are in the seventeenth percentile among all Louisiana schools for 
performance on the state standardized LEAP test, which is about the same percentile 
ranking of the schools before the takeover, while student performance on the NAEP 
has remained static); Michael Deshotels, LEAP Scores Manipulated, LA. EDUCATOR 
(Aug. 17, 2014), http://louisianaeducator.blogspot.com/2014/08/leap-scores-
manipulated.html (explaining that the percentage of students passing the LEAP 
remained steady despite the LEAP getting harder because the number of correct 
answers for a passing score was significantly reduced in three of four categories). 
 11. Beginning in the 2012–2013 school year, the Louisiana Department of 
Education changed the scale by which schools are given SPS scores. THE COWEN 
INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 20.  When the scale changed, there were fifty-
five percent fewer F schools but also fewer A schools. Id.  The grades converged 
towards the middle of the pack. Id.  “[T]he main reason RSD has made such great 
strides in grade level performance is that from 2012 to 2013 the state changed the 
formula and scale for measuring school performance, which artificially inflated 
RSD’s score.” Bryant, supra note 10. Of thirty-seven RSD schools with complete 
information, twenty-six increased a letter grade due to change in the scoring system. 
Id.  If the same standards had applied, fifteen schools would have received a D 
instead of a C, five would have received an F instead of a D, and five would have 
received a C instead of a B. Id.  The district letter grade would have remained a D. 
Id.; see also Danielle Dreilinger, New Orleans’ Recovery System Changes Heighten 
Charter School Debate, NPR Reports, TIMES-PICAYUNE, http://www.nola.com/
education/index.ssf/2014/08/new_orleans_recovery_system_op.html (explaining that 
the growth in non-failing schools is partly because failed schools recently turned over 
to new operators are not included in the statistics); Harden, supra note 2 (contrasting 
the state’s praise of school performance in New Orleans with the blogosphere’s 
“carefully documented details of the state’s systemic and persistent manipulation—
and illegal withholding—of public data”). 
 12. See School Performance Scores Released: 2013–14 Was a Stand Still Year, 
EDUCATE NOW, http://campaign.r20.constantcontact.com/render?ca=3d310f92-4d4b-
4b3b-b8f5-5626177c4106&c=d405bca0-356d-11e3-b8bb-d4ae52a459cd&ch=d4dff000-
356d-11e3-b928-d4ae52a459cd (showing that after seven years of growth, the School 
Performance Scores and overall district score remained flat in the 2013–2014 school 
year). 
 13. PATRICK SIMS & DEBRA VAUGHAN, THE COWEN INST., BEATING THE ODDS: 
ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE AND VULNERABLE STUDENT POPULATIONS IN NEW 
ORLEANS PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOLS 9 (2014) [hereinafter SIMS & VAUGHAN, BEATING 
THE ODDS]; U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE FOUND., LEADERS & LAGGARDS: A 
STATE-BY-STATE REPORT CARD ON K-12 EDUCATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 63 (2014), 
available at http://www.leadersandlaggards.org/sites/default/files/Leaders%20
and%20Laggards%20A%20State-by-State%20Report%20Card%20on%20K-12%20
Educational%20Effectiveness.pdf; Jessica Williams, New Orleans Public Schools 
Have Seen Successes, Challenges in Past Year, New Report Says, TIMES-PICAYUNE, 
Aug. 6, 2014, http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/08/new_orleans_public_
schools_have_seen_successes_challenges_in_past_year_new_report_says.html 
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of students in charter schools than in traditional schools,14 while 
opponents claim that student demographic and school funding 
differences pre- and post-Katrina, and between charter and non-
charter schools, make comparisons impossible.15  Again, there is an 
element of truth in each of these polar positions: a perfect apples-to-
apples comparison is impossible, but the best available data indicates 
that charter schools are improving student performance in New 
Orleans.16  The schools are almost certainly better academically, but 
at what cost? 
One of the most repeated “costs” of the new system of schools is 
that it does not respond to community and neighborhood needs.  By 
divorcing school attendance from place of residence, New Orleans 
lost the neighborhood school that provided numerous support 
mechanisms to the surrounding community.17  In a city where the 
average student lives over three miles from school, and one in four 
travels over five miles, it is virtually impossible for the schools to be 
the community centers they were before the storm.18  Neighborhood 
schools were anchors binding small communities together; the charter 
schools that replaced them are not.19 
                                                                                                                 
(explaining that while there is academic progress, scores still lag behind other public 
school systems). 
 14. From 2005 to 2011, New Orleans charter schools performed significantly 
better than traditional public school counterparts. CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC. 
OUTCOMES, CHARTER SCHOOL PERFORMANCE IN LOUISIANA 7 (2013). 
 15. Layton, supra note 2; William J. Mathis & Andrew Maul, New Orleans 
Charter School Study: Comparing Incomparables, Repeated Errors, and Small 
Differences, NAT’L EDUC. POL’Y CENTER (Aug. 22, 2013), http://nepc.colorado.edu/
newsletter/2013/08/review-credo-2013-NOLA (“But the evidence provided by the 
new CREDO study falls well short of Gov. Jindal’s ‘proof’ of the success of charter 
schools in either the city or the state.”). 
 16. PATRICK SIMS & VINCENT ROSSMEIER, THE COWEN INST., THE STATE OF 
PUBLIC EDUCATION IN NEW ORLEANS: TEN YEARS AFTER HURRICAN KATRINA 18–
20 (2015), available at http://www.speno2015.com/images/SPENO.2015.small.pdf. 
 17. Layton, supra note 2; Daniel Kiel, The Endangered School District: The 
Challenge and Promise of Redistributing Control of Public Education, 22 B.U. PUB. 
INT. L.J. 341, 357–58 (2014) (explaining how a “portfolio” model of schools lessens 
democratic accountability). 
 18. Danielle Dreilinger, How One New Orleans Neighborhood Worked to 
Reopen Its School—And Lost, TIMES-PICAYUNE July 21, 2014, http://www.nola.com/
education/index.ssf/2014/07/hollygrove_the_recovery_school.html; Kamenetz, supra 
note 3; Katy Reckdahl, New Orleans’ Afterschool Scene Has a Transportation 
Problem, NEXT CITY (Sept. 9, 2014), http://nextcity.org/daily/entry/new-orleans-
enviable-afterschool-scene-has-a-transportation-problem (explaining that 
connections to community resources are made more easily in traditional 
neighborhood school systems). 
 19. Susan L. DeJarnatt, Community Losses: The Costs of Education Reform, 45 
U. TOL. L. REV. 579, 586–88 (2014); Civil Rights Complaint from Journey for Justice 
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Another “cost”—one that often gets overshadowed by the loud 
debate about outcome data and community loss—is equity.  While the 
entire system may be improving, it is important to understand 
whether it is at the expense of marginalized, subordinated, and 
vulnerable students, schools, or neighborhoods.20  This Article focuses 
on equity when answering the question of whether the New Orleans 
system of schools is working. 
New Orleans education stands at a crossroads in deciding how to 
achieve equity for its vulnerable student populations.  Down the path 
to the right lies the market-driven reform that underlies the charter 
movement and reliance on specialized schools serving the unique 
needs of each student.  This is the path New Orleans followed for 
seven years after the storm.  Down the path to the left lie centralizing 
services, planning, and oversight to ensure that every school provides 
an appropriate education to any type of student that walks through 
every schoolhouse door.  New Orleans has moved towards this route 
more recently, but political forces prevent the system from seeing the 
centralization path to the end.  Or New Orleans could keep a foot in 
both approaches: some specialized schools but at least minimum 
services provided in every school with centralized oversight. 
How equal education opportunity is defined is vital to determining 
which path New Orleans should ultimately choose.  The traditional 
view of equality, rooted in the holding of Brown vs. Board of 
Education of Topeka21—that separate is inherently unequal—compels 
assurance that students of all types can be served properly at every 
school.  Achieving “inclusion equality” requires centralizing services 
for the most vulnerable students.  Even the staunchest supporters of 
charter schools recognize that the “decentralized nature of public 
education in New Orleans creates potential barriers for the system to 
equitably serve the needs of all students.”22  But the emerging view of 
                                                                                                                 
Alliance to Eric J. Holder, Attorney Gen., United States 15 (May 13, 2014) 
[hereinafter Civil Rights Complaint], available at http://b.3cdn.net/advancement/
24a04d1624216c28b1_4pm6y9lvo.pdf. 
 20. Our Public Education System Needs Transformation, Not ‘Reform’, NATION 
(Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/181742/our-public-education-
system-needs-transformation-not-reform# (“Without education equity, we don’t have 
an educational system at all—we have a rigged rat race that starts in kindergarten.”); 
see also Eden B. Heilman, Stranger than Fiction: The Experiences of Students with 
Disabilities in the Post-Katrina New Orleans Education System, 59 LOY. L. REV. 355, 
380 (2014) (“A true system of choice cannot be successful unless it includes and 
serves all students . . . .”). 
 21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 22. THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 3; see Scott Cowen, The 
New Orleans Experiment in School Reform: Lessons Learned, HUFFINGTON POST 
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equality in education is that separate can be equal if all students are 
performing better in specialized environments chosen freely by the 
parents.  Under this “empowerment equality,” if vulnerable students 
perform better in specialized charter schools that are designed to 
serve them, and if overall student performance rises, then the system 
may be separate, but more equal.  Whether the trajectory in New 
Orleans towards decentralization and specialization is “equitable” 
hinges on which version of equality is accepted. 
This Article focuses on the barriers to achieving equity in a system 
of schools and the path New Orleans has chosen, and will likely 
pursue in the future, to overcome them.  Part I describes the changes 
to the education system made after Katrina and the current education 
landscape from a governance perspective.  Part II discusses the 
impact of decentralization on vulnerable populations—students with 
disabilities, English language learners, African-American students, 
and low-income students—and what New Orleans has done to 
address equity for these groups.  Finally, Part III discusses how an all-
charter system of specialized schools illuminates competing theories 
of equity in education.  It argues that unless there is a concerted, 
collective effort to pursue inclusion equality—the equality envisioned 
in Brown—New Orleans will adopt the new “empowerment equality” 
perspective by default because it is an inherent and natural outgrowth 
of a decentralized system of schools. 
I.  THE EDUCATION LANDSCAPE OF NEW ORLEANS 
A. The Evolution of a System of Schools 
The path New Orleans followed to its current system of schools 
was uniquely shaped by natural disaster.  Before Hurricane Katrina 
the OPSB looked like a typical urban district at the time: nearly all 
schools were directly operated by the centralized bureaucracy in the 
OPSB, there was a smattering of charter schools, and a few failing 
schools had been taken over by the state under accountability 
measures adopted to comply with the No Child Left Behind Act.23  
The OPSB made decisions for all of its schools—ranging from hiring, 
                                                                                                                 
(Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/scott-cowen/the-new-orleans-
experimen_b_5702778.html (explaining that decentralization has significant costs). 
 23. Before Katrina there were 117 OPSB schools, 5 RSD schools, and 2 
independent charters under BESE. Danielle Dreilinger, New Orleans Public Schools 
Pre-Katrina and Now, by the Numbers, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 29, 2014, 
http://blog.nola.com/education_impact/print.html?entry=/2014/08/new_orleans_publi
c_schools_pre.html; see also Kiel, supra note 17, at 363–65. 
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to teacher placement, to curriculum, to purchasing—and the teacher’s 
union exerted considerable control.24 
While the governance structure was ordinary, the system was 
extraordinary for all the wrong reasons.  Before Katrina, New 
Orleans was one of the worst urban school districts in the nation, and 
most of its schools were “academically unacceptable” under state 
standards.25  The OPSB was plagued by corruption and financial 
mismanagement, with over $265 million in debt and a Federal Bureau 
of Investigation task force housed in the district office to root out 
graft.26  It was a school district in need of reform. 
Hurricane Katrina flooded New Orleans on the second Monday of 
the 2005–06 school year.  It caused the displacement of 64,000 
students and $800 million in damage to public school buildings.27  
Fewer than twenty of the 120 school buildings remained useable after 
the hurricane.  Students, teachers, and administrators were all forced 
to evacuate, and the tax base supporting the schools was decimated.28 
Days after the storm, the OPSB placed thousands of its teachers on 
unpaid leave and fired them three months later.29  The state 
legislature moved quickly and amended its accountability laws to 
remove 102 of 117 schools from the control of OPSB and place them 
                                                                                                                 
 24. SARA CARR, HOPE AGAINST HOPE: THREE SCHOOLS, ONE CITY, AND THE 
STRUGGLE TO EDUCATE AMERICA’S CHILDREN 77–78 (2013). 
 25. See Paul Hill & Jane Hannaway, The Future of Public Education in New 
Orleans, in AFTER KATRINA: REBUILDING OPPORTUNITY AND EQUITY INTO THE NEW 
NEW ORLEANS 27, 28 (Margery Austin Turner & Sheila R. Zedlewski eds., 2006), 
available at http://webarchive.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311406_after_katrina.pdf; 
Danielle Holley-Walker, The Accountability Cycle: The Recovery School District 
Act and New Orleans’ Charter Schools, 40 CONN. L. REV. 125, 127 (2007).  
“Academically unacceptable” is a school performance label used by the Louisiana 
Department of Education in assessing individual schools and districts.  It is based on 
a School Performance Score, which is determined by dropout rates, attendance rates, 
and standardized exam scores. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:3911–12 (2001). 
 26. Holley-Walker, supra note 25, at 127; SCOTT S. COWEN INST. FOR PUB. EDUC., 
CREATING A GOVERNING FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION IN NEW ORLEANS: 
SCHOOL DISTRICT POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 9–10 (2009), available at http://www.cowen
institute.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/gov.report1.final_revised.pdf (detailing 
corruption and mismanagement issues in OPSB prior to the storm); UNITED 
TEACHERS OF NEW ORLEANS ET AL., ‘NATIONAL MODEL’ OR FLAWED APPROACH?: 
THE POST-KATRINA NEW ORLEANS PUBLIC SCHOOLS 10–11 (2006), available at http://
www.naomiklein.org/files/resources/pdfs/aft-nov-2006.pdf.  The financial problems 
were so severe that the United States Department of Education threatened to 
discontinue educational funding to the entire state. See Oliver v. Orleans Parrish Sch. 
Bd., 156 So. 3d 596, 600 (La. 2014). 
 27. Kathryn G. Newmark & Veronique De Rugy, Hope After Katrina: Will New 
Orleans Become the New City of Choice?, EDUC. NEXT, Fall 2006, at 14. 
 28. Hill & Hannaway, supra note 25, at 27. 
 29. Oliver, 156 So. 3d at 602–03. 
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in the hands of the RSD, an arm of the state Department of 
Education designed to take over failing schools.30  The RSD 
immediately began operating the transferred schools directly, but it 
always had the intention of transferring governance to charter school 
operators.31 
These critical decisions, made quickly after the storm, removed 
what many believed to be the two biggest obstacles, historically, to 
improving New Orleans’ schools: the OPSB and the teachers’ 
unions.32  The moves embodied the popular reforms across the 
country—state takeover of failing schools (stripping elected boards of 
power) and chartering schools (stripping teachers’ unions of power).33  
But because of Katrina, it was done faster and more thoroughly in 
New Orleans than it had been done in any other city. 
Since Katrina, the OPSB has managed the few schools it was left 
with—either directly running them or by charter oversight.34  The 
RSD also directly ran numerous schools but steadily chartered them 
out to private operators.35  The RSD was not prepared for the 
monumental task of operating schools in a decimated city, and the 
RSD direct run schools quickly became the worst schools in the city 
and the dumping ground for the students deemed most difficult to 
educate.36 
B. The System of Schools Today 
Today there is a confusing patchwork of school governance in New 
Orleans.37  As of the 2014–15 school year, there are eighty-three 
public schools educating 44,686 students.38  Two bodies loosely govern 
these schools: the OPSB, and the Louisiana Board of Elementary and 
Secondary Education (BESE) through its administrative arm, the 
RSD.39 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Id.; Layton, supra note 2. 
 31. CARR, supra note 24, at 17; Layton, supra note 2; Civil Rights Complaint, 
supra note 19, at 10–11. 
 32. Robert A. Garda, Jr., The Politics of Education Reform: Lessons Learned 
from New Orleans, 40 J.L. & EDUC. 57, 65 (2011). 
 33. Id. at 68. 
 34. SIMS & ROSSMEIER, supra note 16, at 4–6. 
 35. Id. at 11. 
 36. CARR, supra note 24; OSBORNE, supra note 5, at 6. 
 37. Kevin McGill, Hope, Resentment in New Orleans’ Charter School Landscape, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 20, 2014), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/hope-resentment-
new-charter-school-landscape. 
 38. Dreilinger, supra note 23. 
 39. SIMS & ROSSMEIER, supra note 16, at 4–6. 
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As of the 2014–15 school year, the RSD no longer directly operates 
any schools.40  Rather, the RSD oversees fifty-six charter schools that 
enroll sixty-seven percent of the student population.41  These “Type 
5” charter schools, or “RSD charters” as they are known in town, are 
pre-existing public schools transferred to the RSD as failing schools 
after Katrina and later chartered with BESE.42  These charter schools 
are prohibited from using admission requirements and are considered 
their own freestanding school districts, or, in technical jargon, local 
educational agencies (LEAs).43 
LEAs, typically school districts overseeing numerous schools, are 
the primary government units responsible for education under state 
and federal law.  It is the LEA, not individual schools within the 
LEA, which bears final responsibility for compliance with most state 
and federal laws.  The RSD charter schools that are their own one-
school LEAs are treated the same under state and federal law, as are 
school districts that usually contain numerous schools, such as the 
OPSB.44 
BESE directly oversees four charter schools, educating four 
percent of the student population.45  These “Type 2” charter schools 
enroll students from across the state and are permitted to utilize 
admission requirements.46  Like RSD charters, these charter schools 
are also independent LEAs.47 
OPSB enrolls twenty-eight percent of the student population in six 
schools it directly runs and the fourteen charter schools it oversees.48  
The OPSB direct-run schools are the only non-charter public schools 
in New Orleans.  OPSB is the chartering and oversight agency for 
Type 1 (startup) and Type 3 (conversion) charter schools.49  These 
charter schools are permitted to utilize admission requirements “that 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Danielle Dreilinger, Recovery School District Downsizes from 568 Employees 
to 92, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 5, 2014, http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/
09/recovery_school_district_downs.html [hereinafter Dreilinger, Recovery School 
District Downsizes from 568 Employees to 92]. 
 41. THE COWEN INST., NOLA BY THE NUMBERS, supra note 8, at 2. 
 42. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:3973(2)(b)(v) (2013). 
 43. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:3995(H) (2011). 
 44. See, e.g., Thompson v. Bd. of Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 144 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 
1998); Friendship Edison Pub. Charter Sch. Chamberlain Campus v. Smith, 561 F. 
Supp. 2d 74 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 45. THE COWEN INST., NOLA BY THE NUMBERS, supra note 8, at 2. 
 46. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:3973(2)(b)(ii). 
 47. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:3995(H). 
 48. THE COWEN INST., NOLA BY THE NUMBERS, supra note 8, at 2; Dreilinger, 
supra note 23. 
 49. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:3973(2)(b)(i), (ii). 
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are consistent with the school’s role, scope and mission . . . .”50  These 
schools are not independent LEAs, but instead are part of the OPSB 
LEA.51 
New Orleans is far and away the most decentralized education 
governance system in the United States.  There are six traditional 
direct-run schools and seventy-six charter schools.  Of these seventy-
six charter schools, sixty-two are LEAs.  Put another way, there are 
sixty-three independent school districts (including the OPSB) within 
the city’s geographic boundaries.  Forty-four different school boards 
operate these LEAs: the OPSB, BESE (through the RSD), twelve 
charter management organizations, and thirty charter boards 
overseeing only one school each.52 
Compounding this fractured system is the fact that the two entities 
with the best ability to plan centrally for the school system—the 
OPSB and the RSD—essentially hate one another.53  They often act 
more like competitors than governmental entities engaged in the 
common goal of educating students.  They fight over school quality, 
control, facilities, and financing in meetings and the courts.54 
To charter and choice proponents, the New Orleans system of 
schools is a dream come true.  Parents can choose any school in the 
city (almost) for their children, allowing the education market to 
weed out bad schools and support successful schools, thereby raising 
overall quality for all students.  Teachers’ unions and large command-
and-control bureaucracies are practically gone.55  To charter 
opponents, it could not be a worse nightmare.  Democratic control 
and community have been thrown under the school bus, and the 
                                                                                                                 
 50. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:3991(B)(3) (2011). 
 51. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:3995(I).  There is also one independent public 
school operated under the jurisdiction of the state legislature. THE COWEN INST., 
NOLA BY THE NUMBERS, supra note 8, at 2. 
 52. THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 6 (explaining that more than 
half the charter schools in the city are run by Charter Management Organizations). 
 53. Danielle Dreilinger, In Move Towards Cooperation New Orleans’ Two 
School Systems Consider Agreement with Millions for Troubled Youth, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Mar. 13, 2014, http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/03/new_
orleans_two_school_systems_2.html [hereinafter Dreilinger, In Move Towards 
Cooperation]. 
 54. THE COWEN INST., THE STATE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN NEW ORLEANS 2010 
REPORT 30, 36 (2010) [hereinafter THE COWEN INST., 2010 REPORT]. 
 55. See SIMS & ROSSMEIER, supra note 16, at 3; Marta Jewson, Teachers Unions 
on the Rise Again in New Orleans, 10 Years After Charters Pushed Them Out, 
HECHINGER REP. (Apr. 13, 2015), http://hechingerreport.org/teachers-unions-on-the-
rise-again-in-new-orleans-10-years-after-charters-pushed-them-out/. 
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winners are the middle and high-income whites, while the losers are 
the vulnerable and historically subordinated student populations. 
II.  EQUITY IN THE NEW ORLEANS SYSTEM OF SCHOOLS 
A decentralized, all-charter school system creates significant 
barriers to providing equity, especially to at-risk students such as 
English language learners, students with disabilities, poor students, 
and minorities.  This Part will discuss the treatment of these 
marginalized groups, the barriers to achieving equality that inheres in 
a system of schools, and the steps that have been taken in New 
Orleans, both intentional and unintentional, to address equity. 
A. Race and Class Equity 
Race was an important subtext in the transformation of the New 
Orleans schools after Katrina.  While the charter movement views 
itself as the new civil rights movement—bringing choice to families 
trapped in failing schools—post-Katrina events in New Orleans reveal 
why some view the movement as a plot to divest African-Americans 
of control of their schools.56  The process by which New Orleans 
transformed itself to a system of schools laid the foundation on which 
today’s allegations of discrimination are built. 
The teaching force—mostly middle class African-American career 
teachers—was terminated after Katrina.57  These teachers alleged that 
instead of receiving the legally mandated “priority consideration” for 
hire in the RSD schools, the state contracted with Teach for America 
(TFA) to fill the positions, and TFA’ers displaced much of the old 
teaching force.58  The requirement that seventy-five percent of 
teachers in a charter school hold valid teaching certificates was 
repealed in 2012, further opening the door for an alternatively 
                                                                                                                 
 56. CARR, supra note 24; see, e.g., Kristen L. Buras, Race, Charter Schools, and 
Conscious Capitalism: On the Spatial Politics of Whiteness as Property (and the 
Unconscionable Assault on Black New Orleans), 81 HARV. EDUC. REV. 296 (2011). 
 57. A Louisiana trial court and appellate court ruled that the termination was 
wrongful and awarded nearly $1 billion damages, Oliver v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 
No. 2005-12244, 2012 WL 2648083, (La. Civ. Dist. Ct. June 20, 2012), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 133 So. 3d 38 (La. Ct. App.), writ granted, 141 So. 3d 274 (La. 2014), but 
these decisions were overturned by the Louisiana Supreme Court, Oliver v. Orleans 
Parrish Sch. Bd., 156 So. 3d 596, 623 (La. 2014). 
 58. See Oliver, 156 So. 3d at 622; see also THE COWEN INST., THE STATE OF 
PUBLIC EDUCATION IN NEW ORLEANS: FIVE YEARS AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA 15 
(2010) [hereinafter THE COWEN INST., FIVE YEARS AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA]; 
CARR, supra note 24, at 36–39, 61, 84–85, 118–20 (2013); Buras, supra note 56, at 310; 
Civil Rights Complaint, supra note 19, at 14–15.  
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certified teaching force.59  Today, only fifty-four percent of the 
teaching force is minority, and that number is declining.60  The 
replacement of the teaching force was seen as “an attack on the city’s 
black middle class, even if not intended as such.”61  School 
administrators, again mostly African-American pre-Katrina, were 
also replaced by non-local whites.  The army of TFA’ers has become 
so entrenched that they increasingly “run the show” in New Orleans.62 
Even charter authorization decisions were taken out of the hands 
of the local school board, which were long controlled by African-
Americans.  Act 235, the key legislation allowing the RSD to take 
over the OPSB schools and begin the chartering process, prohibited 
districts declared in academic crisis, e.g. New Orleans, from issuing 
new charters.63  The Act also mandated that chartering decisions 
comply with Standards for Quality School Authorizing promulgated 
by the National Alliance of Charter School Authorizers (NACSA) 
and required authorizers to utilize independent evaluators such as 
NACSA.64  Chartering decisions appeared removed not only from 
New Orleanians, but from Louisianans as well.  Later, changes were 
made to the charter-enabling statute that permitted the state to 
                                                                                                                 
 59. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, § 2903 (2012); Buras, supra note 56, at 309, 315. 
 60. THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 19.  In 2007, TFA predicted 
that one in three students in New Orleans would be taught by a TFA teacher. THE 
COWEN INST., STATE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN NEW ORLEANS: 2008 REPORT, at 27 
(2008) [hereinafter THE COWEN INST., 2008 REPORT].  In the 2007–2008 school year, 
sixty percent of the RSD teachers had less than one year of experience, compared to 
only ten percent having less than one year of experience before the storm. THE 
COWEN INST., 2010 REPORT, supra note 54, at 24; THE COWEN INST., FIVE YEARS 
AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA, supra note 58, at 14.  That general trend continues, 
though the teacher experience level is gradually increasing. See THE COWEN INST., 
THE STATE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN NEW ORLEANS 2012, at 20–21 (2012); THE 
COWEN INST., THE STATE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN NEW ORLEANS 2013, at 15–16 
(2013) (“Many schools in New Orleans rely on new teachers recruited through 
programs like Teach For America and the New Teacher Project’s teachNOLA.”). 
 61. CARR, supra note 24, at 121. 
 62. Id. at 245. 
 63. 2005 La. Act 35 (codified as amended at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 17:3982(b), 
17:3983(2)(a)(ii)).  This ban was not lifted until 2011. 2012 Act 2 (codified as 
amended at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 17:3983(2)); Buras, supra note 56, at 308. 
 64. 2005 La. Act 35 (codified as amended at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
17:3973(2)(b)(v)(aa)); 2009 La. Act 123 (codified as amended at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
17:3981(4)); 2006 La. Act 123 (codified as amended at LA. REV. STAT. ANN 
17:3992(A)(1)(a); see also LA. ADMIN CODE tit. 126, 28 CXXXIX §§ 303(a)(2), 
306(a)(2) (2012). 
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certify local charter authorizers other than elected school boards, 
further eroding the power of school boards.65 
With the African-American controlled OPSB cut-out of the 
chartering process, and charter creation and oversight moved to other 
entities often controlled by high income whites, such as BESE, 
NACSA, or non-profits, it is easy to see how blacks felt entirely 
removed from controlling the education of their children.  As noted 
by Sara Carr—the education reporter for the local paper who wrote a 
moving and insightful book about New Orleans education—control 
over the schools has passed from “a predominantly black middle class 
to a largely affluent white business class.”66 
And there is concern that these new leaders are not responsive to 
community desires and that parents are disenfranchised.67  When the 
charter applications of highly regarded local black educators were 
turned down by the state, it only added fuel to the cries of 
discrimination.68  This disempowerment creates fertile ground for 
critics to view numerous practices as racially discriminatory, 
particularly when poor minorities are not proportionately enrolled in 
the best schools. 
As in any school district across the country, there is a wide 
disparity in quality among the schools in New Orleans.69  There is also 
a large disparity in student demographics among the schools.  
National studies indicate that charter schools nationwide segregate by 
race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status.70  This segregation exists in 
New Orleans, and it appears directly tied to school quality.71 
                                                                                                                 
 65. 2012 Act 2 (codfied as amended at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 17:3973(2)(b)(vi), 
17:3973(4), 17:3981.1, 3981.2); LA. ADMIN CODE tit. 126 § 403 (2013); Buras, supra 
note 56, at 314. 
 66. CARR, supra note 24, at 66, 197–99; see also Civil Rights Complaint, supra 
note 19, at 4–5. 
 67. Buras, supra note 56, at 300; DeJarnatt, supra note 19; Dreilinger, supra note 
18 (telling the story of a neighborhood school that is a case study in how “the 
complex, undemocratic state-run school system makes key decisions about what 
schools will grow in which neighborhoods—with the community's desires literally tied 
for the lowest priority”); Layton, supra note 2; see also Civil Rights Complaint, supra 
note 19, at 14 (“Parents have been excluded from the decision-making process to 
close schools and have few ways to hold State officials accountable.”). 
 68. CARR, supra note 24, at 197–98. 
 69. See id. at 254; Peter Cook, Stop Saying Market-Based Reform. Please, 
PETERCOOK.COM (Sept. 2, 2014), http://peterccook.com/2014/09/02/enough-with-
market-based-reform/. 
 70. See, e.g., ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, CHOICE 
WITHOUT EQUITY: CHARTER SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND THE NEED FOR CIVIL 
RIGHTS STANDARDS 4 (2010), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/
k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/choice-without-equity-2009-report/
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Eighty-five percent of public school students in New Orleans are 
eligible for free and reduced lunch (FRL).  This is the highest 
percentage of students in poverty in any major urban center in the 
country.72  These students are not distributed evenly across schools.73  
The highest performing schools enroll the fewest FRL students.  The 
RSD schools have a rate of 95% FRL students, compared to a rate of 
68% for OPSB schools.74  The four BESE charter schools enroll an 
average of 56% FRL students, and the fourteen OPSB charter 
schools (many of which are selective admissions) enroll an average of 
61% FRL students.75 
The racial compositions of schools are equally lopsided.  The youth 
population in New Orleans is 73% African-American, but because of 
the high rate of privately educated white students, the public school 
population is 85% African-American.76  But only 63% of students in 
the high performing OPSB charter schools are African-American, 
compared to a 96% rate in RSD charters and 95% rate in OPSB 
direct-run schools.77  There are only two public schools in the whole of 
New Orleans that are representative of the racial composition of New 
Orleans’ youth.78 
The impact this stratification has on academic outcomes can be 
viewed as grossly discriminatory or a huge success story, depending 
                                                                                                                 
frankenberg-choices-without-equity-2010.pdf (“[T]he charter sector continues to 
stratify students by race, class and possibly language.”); ROSLYN MICKELSON ET AL., 
SCHOOL CHOICE AND SEGREGATION BY RACE, ETHNICITY, CLASS AND 
ACHIEVEMENT 1 (2008), available at http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/CHOICE-08-
Mickelson-FINAL-EG043008.pdf (“The preponderance of social science research 
indicates that students who participate in almost all forms of choice attend schools 
that are segregated . . . .”); Osamudia R. James, Opt-Out Education: School Choice 
as Racial Subordination, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1083, 1116 (2014). 
 71. See Buras, supra note 56, at 320–321. 
 72. THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 11; Dreilinger, supra note 23; 
Kamenetz, supra note 3. 
 73. SIMS & VAUGHAN, supra note 13, at 1. 
 74. Id.; see also CARR, supra note 24; Letter from the Recovery School District to 
the Office of Civil Rights 2 (Oct. 8, 2014), http://educatenow.net/wp-content/uploads/
2014/10/RSD_OCR_Letter_10-8-14.pdf. 
 75. THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 11; see also CARR, supra 
note 24; Letter from the Recovery School District to the Office of Civil Rights, supra 
note 74, at 1. 
 76. THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 10; THE COWEN INST., 
NOLA BY THE NUMBERS, supra note 8, at 6; Kamenetz, supra note 3. 
 77. THE COWEN INST., NOLA BY THE NUMBERS, supra note 8, at 5; see CARR, 
supra note 24, at 280; Letter from the Recovery School District to the Office of Civil 
Rights, supra note 74, at 2. 
 78. THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 29; THE COWEN INST., 
NOLA BY THE NUMBERS, supra note 8, at 6. 
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on how the data is parsed.  On the one hand, black students have 
made the most gains of any subgroup in New Orleans.79  Before 
Katrina, only thirty-two percent of African-American students scored 
basic or above on state exams, which was well below the state 
average.80  Now, fifty-eight percent score basic or above, which 
exceeds the state average for African-Americans.81  In fact, black 
students in New Orleans are outperforming their counterparts in 
other parts of the state for the first time.82  And the percentage of 
black students, and poor students, that attend F-rated schools has 
plummeted since Katrina.83  The Center for Research on Education 
Outcomes, one of the leading research institutes in evaluating charter 
effectiveness, determined that charter schools in New Orleans had a 
positive impact for poor and African-American students.84 
On the other hand, there is little debate that higher income and 
white students disproportionately attend the best schools in New 
Orleans, while poor minorities almost exclusively attend the worst 
schools.85  The total public school enrollment in New Orleans is seven 
percent white,86 but the most successful public schools in New Orleans 
have a much higher percentage of white students.  Of the seven 
highest rated schools, only one has more black students than the 
norm—the others are twenty-six to fifty-four percent white.87  At the 
                                                                                                                 
 79. OSBORNE, supra note 5, at 8–9 (“Indeed, the gains made by black students are 
the most impressive . . . .”); Cook, supra note 8 (“[L]ow-income and minority 
students have been the prime beneficiaries of the improvements in New Orleans 
schools.”). 
 80. Dreilinger, supra note 23. 
 81. Id. 
 82. CARR, supra note 24, at 280; Letter from the Recovery School District to the 
Office of Civil Rights, supra note 74, at 1. 
 83. See School Performance Scores Released: 2013–14 Was a Stand Still Year, 
supra note 12. 
 84. CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, CHARTER SCHOOL PERFORMANCE 
IN LOUISIANA 7 (2013); Letter from the Recovery School District to the Office of 
Civil Rights, supra note 74, at 4.  The methodology and conclusions of the CREDO 
study have been questioned by other researchers. See, e.g., Layton, supra note 2; 
William J. Mathis & Andrew Maul, New Orleans Charter School Study: Comparing 
Incomparables, Repeated Errors, and Small Differences, NAT’L EDUC. POL’Y 
CENTER (Aug. 22, 2013), http://nepc.colorado.edu/newsletter/2013/08/review-credo-
2013-NOLA (“But the evidence provided by the new CREDO study falls well short 
of Gov. Jindal’s ‘proof’ of the success of charter schools in either the city or the 
state.”). 
 85. Layton, supra note 2. 
 86. THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 10. 
 87. Danielle Dreilinger, Civil Rights Complaint Alleges Unequal Treatment for 
New Orleans’ Black Public School Students, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 15, 2014, 
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other end of the spectrum, only two of the numerous D, F, and 
turnaround-rated schools have any white students at all.88  Students in 
the higher-income, lower-minority OPSB schools are performing 
much better by all measures—ACT scores, graduation rates, end of 
course exams, LEAP tests, and college matriculation—than the RSD 
charter schools and OPSB direct-run schools.89 
Critics of the New Orleans system of schools allege that this 
balkanization is due to schools choosing whom they educate, either by 
selecting which students to admit or removing students they do not 
want.90  But a third, and often-ignored, reason for this racial and 
socioeconomic stratification is parent choice.91  Each of these reasons 
is discussed next. 
1. Access Equity 
One of the biggest challenges since Katrina has been fair and 
equitable access to schools.  Until 2012, parents had to apply directly 
to each separate school, and each school would control its own 
lottery, admissions, and wait-lists.92  This presented huge challenges to 
both parents and schools.  The myriad of school options—RSD 
direct-run, OPSB direct-run, RSD charters, OPSB charters, BESE 
charters—overwhelmed parents because there was no central location 
at which to obtain information.93  Once informed about the schools, 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/05/civil_rights_complaint_alleges.html; 
see also Civil Rights Complaint, supra note 19, at 16–17. 
 88. Dreilinger, supra note 87. 
 89. CARR, supra note 24, at 57; THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 
20–22; Dreilinger, New Orleans High School Exam Results, supra note 8. 
 90. See, e.g., UNITED TEACHERS OF NEW ORLEANS, LA. FED’N OF TEACHERS & 
AM. FED’N OF TEACHERS, ‘NATIONAL MODEL’ OR FLAWED APPROACH?: THE POST-
KATRINA NEW ORLEANS PUBLIC SCHOOLS 10–11 (2006), available at http://
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Jarvis DeBerry, How Good are Schools if Students Can’t Get In?, TIMES-PICAYUNE, 
Nov. 15, 2009, http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2009/11/how_good_are_
schools_if_studen.html; Bill Quigley, Experimenting on Someone Else’s Children: 
Fighting for the Right to Learn in New Orleans, COUNTERPUNCH (Aug. 6, 2007), 
http://www.counterpunch.org/quigley08062007.html. 
 91. Buras, supra note 56, at 307. 
 92. OSBORNE, supra note 5, at 20; THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, 
at 17. 
 93. Cheryl Bratt et al., N.O. Schools of No Schools?: Absolute Deprivation of 
Educational Opportunity in Post-Katrina New Orleans as a Violation of a 
Fundamental Right to a Minimally Adequate Education, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
407, 414 (2008); Garda, supra note 32, at 89–90. 
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parents had to engage in “a tiring scavenger hunt,” on different 
admission dates, and fill out numerous applications with no guarantee 
of getting into any school at all, let alone into any particular school.94  
Many parents lacked the skills and the time to negotiate several 
different registration processes.95  Meaningful school choice during 
this period was reserved for well-informed, motivated parents with 
the time and resources to navigate the complex information gathering 
and registration process.96  Even the state acknowledges, “real choice 
did not exist” during this time.97  These enrollment barriers during the 
first seven years after Katrina played a major role in the balkanization 
of New Orleans schools. 
Moreover, charter schools were often accused of massaging their 
student populations in a variety of ways during this period.98  
Aggressive charters worked to get good students, held early lotteries, 
and counseled out families they did not want.  These tactics were 
successful in a decentralized admission system with little oversight 
and almost no transparency.99  It is no surprise that inequities 
developed quickly under this free-for-all, eat-what-you kill system of 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Danielle Dreilinger, Anger, Frustration as Hundreds of New Orleans Parents 
Turned Away from Public School Enrollment Center, TIMES-PICAYUNE, July 9, 2014, 
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is Determined to Find Best Public Pre-K, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 10, 2009, 
http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2009/11/school_choice.html; Editorial, 
Making New Orleans School Choices Easier, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 15, 2009, 
http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2009/11/making_new_orleans_school_choi.ht
ml; Maxwell, supra note 1; Steve Ritea, Public Schools Compete for Kids: New Array 
of Choices Give Parents Power, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 12, 2006, at 1 (“Parents 
willing to do their homework researching schools, state and charter officials say, will 
end up getting their children into the best ones.”). 
 97. Letter from the Recovery School District to the Office of Civil Rights, supra 
note 74, at 5. 
 98. Charter schools want to dictate student population. Harden, supra note 2. 
 99. OSBORNE, supra note 5, at 20; THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, 
at 17. 
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school enrollment.100   School choice during this period often meant 
schools were choosing students, not vice-versa. 
In order to make the system easier to navigate for parents and 
prevent any gaming of enrollment by schools, the RSD introduced 
OneApp for the 2012–13 school year.  OneApp allows parents to 
apply to nearly every charter school in New Orleans by completing 
only one application for each child and to get information on each 
charter school in one centralized location.101  In the November before 
the upcoming school year, parents list on OneApp their top eight 
school choices, in order of preference for each child.  The RSD runs a 
complex algorithm that attempts to place students at their top choices 
and notifies parents of the school selected for their child in April.  If 
the parent is dissatisfied they can re-apply through a second and third 
round of OneApp.  If a parent is still dissatisfied with a child’s 
placement, or is new to the system and has missed all OneApp 
deadlines, he or she can visit a resource center on a first-come, first-
served basis to seek a placement.102  OneApp lists seventy schools 
available for the upcoming 2015–16 school year.103 
OneApp makes the iconic charter school lottery and waitlists a 
thing of the past in New Orleans.  Students are simply placed at 
schools through the OneApp process.  In the 2014–15 school year, 
11,000 students filed through OneApp in the first two rounds.  Eighty 
percent of students in these rounds received one of their top three 
choices.104  Overall, OneApp handled 43,000 students.105  Despite the 
                                                                                                                 
 100. OSBORNE, supra note 5, at 20. 
 101. See Learn About the Process, NEW ORLEANS PUB. SCH. ENROLLMENT, 
http://enrollnola.org/how-does-oneapp-work/. 
 102. Dreilinger, Anger, Frustration as Hundreds of New Orleans Parents Turned 
Away from Public School Enrollment Center, supra note 94. 
 103. Danielle Dreilinger, OneApp Lists More Than 130 New Orleans Public, 
Private and Prekindergarten Programs for 2015–16, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 22, 2014, 
http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/10/oneapp_lists_more_than_130_new.h
tml [hereinafter Dreilinger, OneApp Lists More Than 130 New Programs]. 
 104. Dreilinger, Anger, Frustration as Hundreds of New Orleans Parents Turned 
Away from Public School Enrollment Center, supra note 94; Kamenetz, supra note 3; 
THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2; Peter Cook, This is NPR: Negatively 
Portraying Reform?, PETERCOOK.COM (Aug. 14, 2014), http://peterccook.com/2014/
08/14/this-is-npr/.  In 2012, twenty-two percent of parents did not even complete 
OneApp, and the state placed these students. Mercedes Schneider, New Orleans 
“Parental Choice” and the Walton-Funded OneApp, DEUTSCH29 (July 5, 2013), 
http://deutsch29.wordpress.com/2013/07/05/new-orleans-parental-choice-and-the-
walton-funded-oneapp/. 
 105. Daniele Dreilinger, OneApp Serves 5,000 Families in Summer Enrollment, 
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 14, 2014, http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/08/
oneapp_serves_5000_families_in.html [hereinafter Dreilinger, OneApp Serves 5,000 
Families in Summer Enrollment].  Over seventy percent of students remained 
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apparent success of OneApp in placing students to their top choices, 
the resource centers set up for parents unhappy with their selection 
were overwhelmed this summer with parents seeking to change 
schools.106  Over 5000 new or changed placements were made in July 
through the OneApp process.107 
While the centralization of enrollment through OneApp has solved 
many inequities arising from the old enrollment process, it has not 
fixed them all.  The most obvious problem is that there are not 
enough high quality schools to meet the demand.  There are 18,500 
seats in schools rated A or B, but 45,000 students trying to get those 
seats, and the very top schools are far over-enrolled.108   The odds of 
getting into one of the highest performing schools are astronomically 
small.109  In the words of one parent activist, “[y]ou have a chance, not 
a choice.”110  Until the number of high quality schools increases, 
demand will necessarily continue to outstrip supply at these top 
schools.111 
Another continuing barrier to equal access is that not all schools 
participate in OneApp.112  The holdouts are the OPSB selective 
                                                                                                                 
enrolled in their current school and did not have to complete the OneApp process. 
THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 18. 
 106. Dreilinger, Anger, Frustration as Hundreds of New Orleans Parents Turned 
Away from Public School Enrollment Center, supra note 94; Danielle Dreilinger, 
Hundreds of New Orleans Parents Try Again at Summer Enrollment Center After 
Wednesday Breakdown, TIMES-PICAYUNE, July 10, 2014, http://www.nola.com/
education/index.ssf/2014/07/hundreds_of_new_orleans_parent_1.html; Kamenetz, 
supra note 3. 
 107. Dreilinger, OneApp Serves 5,000 Families in Summer Enrollment, supra note 
105. 
 108. Kamenetz, supra note 3; see also THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra  note 
2, at 29. 
 109. Dreilinger, OneApp Serves 5,000 Families in Summer Enrollment, supra note 
105. 
 110. Lyndsey Layton, Are School Closings the ‘New Jim Crow’? Activists File 
Civil Rights Complaints, WASH. POST, May 13, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/education/2014/05/13/1a0d3ae8-dab9-11e3-b745-87d39690c5c0_story.html; see 
also Kamenetz, supra note 3 (arguing that it is not so much parental choice as it is 
taking what is available). 
 111. In 2012, there were so many poorly performing schools that the RSD fell short 
on its attempt to comply with federal policy requiring school districts to offer high 
quality alternatives to children in failing schools. See Heather Miller, Parents Have 
Few Options When Moving Kids from Failing Public Schools, LENS (Mar. 19, 2013), 
http://thelensnola.org/2013/03/19/parents-have-few-options-when-moving-kids-from-
failing-public-schools/. 
 112. See THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 27; Dreilinger, Anger, 
Frustration as Hundreds of New Orleans Parents Turned Away from Public School 
Enrollment Center, supra note 94; Dreilinger, OneApp Lists More Than 130 New 
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admission schools, discussed below, and the BESE charters—sixteen 
schools in 2014 that will decrease to ten schools in 2015.113  Most of 
the New Orleans A- and B-ranked schools still require their own 
admission applications, deadlines, and procedures.114  Parents hoping 
to get their children into these schools need to engage in the time-
consuming scavenger hunt for schools and applications, meaning 
“[o]nly parents with the means to go through multiple, individual 
admission processes have access to those schools.”115  Recognizing this 
problem, the Louisiana Department of Education is attempting to 
require all schools to participate in OneApp upon each charter’s 
renewal, though this may be as far as a decade away for some 
schools.116 
Schools utilizing selective admissions also hinder equitable access.  
Many of the OPSB schools—by far the best public schools in the 
city—were magnet schools before the storm; the state transformed 
them into charter schools that utilize selective admissions criteria, 
such as performance on standardized tests and grades.117  These 
schools have been a longstanding source of contention in New 
Orleans even before the storm.118  The controversy became more 
pronounced after Katrina because RSD charter schools are 
                                                                                                                 
Programs, supra note 103; Dreilinger, OneApp Serves 5,000 Families in Summer 
Enrollment, supra note 105. 
 113. See SIMS & ROSSMEIER, supra note 16, at 16–17; see also THE COWEN INST., 
2008 REPORT, supra note 60, at 15; THE COWEN INST., FIVE YEARS AFTER 
HURRICANE KATRINA, supra note 58, at 21; Carr, School Choice is a Real Test for 
Parents in New Orleans, supra note 96; Carr, School Choice Series: Mother is 
Determined to Find Best Public Pre-K, supra note 96. 
 114. See Civil Rights Complaint, supra note 19, at 16; Cook, supra note 8; Letter 
from the Recovery School District to the Office of Civil Rights, supra note 74, at 5. 
 115. Letter from the Recovery School District to the Office of Civil Rights, supra 
note 74, at 5; see also Schneider, supra note 104. 
 116. THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 4; Cook, supra note 8; see 
also LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, § 2709(K) (2014) (making OneApp mandatory for type 
2, 4, 5, and 1b charter schools only). 
 117. See THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 18; Garda, supra note 
32, at 67–69, 77; Civil Rights Complaint, supra note 19, at 16–17 (noting that six 
schools currently utilize foreign language or academic admission criteria).  The Office 
of Civil Rights launched an investigation into whether OPSB admission policies are 
racially discriminatory, particularly at selective admission schools. Sarah Carr, Feds 
Investigating Racial Discrimination Complaint Involving Some Orleans Charter 
Schools, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 19, 2010, http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/
2010/01/post_73.html. 
 118. Other parts of the country cite selective admission charter schools for racial 
and socioeconomic segregation as well. See, e.g., Complaint to Office of Civil Rights 
at 3–5, 17–18, ACLU Found. of Del. v. Delaware & Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. 
(Dec. 3, 2014), available at http://www.aclu-de.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/
ACLU-et-al-v.-State-of-Delaware-and-Red-Clay-Consolidated-03-Dec-14.pdf. 
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prohibited from utilizing selective academic admissions.119  But any 
chance that academic selective admission criteria would be abolished 
was put to rest in 2012 when the legislature grandfathered the practice 
of selective admission schools based on academic performance.120 
Equity concerns over access will persist as long as admission 
barriers prevent some students from even being eligible to apply to 
the highest performing schools.  The perception of poor African-
Americans is that selective admission schools are reserved for more 
advantaged children, and that perception appears correct.121  The 
mere existence of selective admission schools that have a much higher 
proportion of whites than other schools confirms racial stratification 
to many black New Orleanians.122  Even John White, the state 
Superintendent and staunch supporter of charter schools and the New 
Orleans system of schools, agrees that exempting selective admission 
schools from OneApp creates access inequity.123 
The use of neighborhood preferences also inhibits fair and open 
access.124  Charter schools are accused of controlling student 
demographics by including a preference in their admissions for 
students residing in the neighborhood.  The OPSB schools have 
always been permitted to use neighborhood preferences and the 
legislature expressly permitted neighborhood preferences in RSD 
charter school admissions in 2010.125  Neighborhood preferences could 
certainly be used as a tool of inclusion rather than exclusion, but that 
has not been the case in New Orleans.  According to a recent civil 
rights complaint filed with the Department of Justice and the 
                                                                                                                 
 119. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3991(B)(1)(d) (2011); Carr, School Choice is a 
Real Test for Parents in New Orleans, supra note 96.  No other state permits charter 
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PICAYUNE, Sept. 11, 2009, http://www.nola.com/
education/index.ssf/2009/09/national_charter_advocate_spea.html. 
 120. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3991; LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, § 2705(B) 
(2014). 
 121. See Maxwell, supra note 1; Schneider, supra note 104. 
 122. Amy Waldman, Reading, Writing, Resurrection, ATLANTIC, Jan./Feb. 2007, 
available at   http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/01/reading-writing-
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 123. Layton, supra note 2. 
 124. See THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 18. 
 125. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3991(B)(4)(b); see also  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 17, §3973(2)(a) (2013); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, § 2701(E) (2014); Andrew 
Vanacore, Some New Orleans Charter Schools Allowed to Save Spots for 
Neighborhood Students, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 8, 2011, 
http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2011/04/some_new_orleans_charter_schoo.h
tml. 
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Department of Education, discussed in detail below, “[t]he two 
schools in New Orleans that give preference to students living in 
surrounding neighborhoods are located in mostly White, middle class 
communities.”126 
Finally, student demographics can be manipulated by giving 
students in school-run, fee-based preschools preference in 
kindergarten admissions.127  This practice ensures that a significant 
number of entering kindergarteners are middle- and high-income 
students.  The use of preferences for students in the school’s pre-
kindergarten program means there are fewer open seats in many 
kindergarten programs, and the odds of getting into a school after 
kindergarten become lower.128  The Louisiana Department of 
Education, recognizing the troubling aspects of this practice, changed 
its regulations to permit lottery exemptions for children in pre-
kindergarten programs that were provided free of charge.  It also 
permitted charter schools that charge tuition for their preschool 
program to seek approval from the charter authorizer to exempt 
these students from the lottery for admission to kindergarten.  “In 
such a case, the [authorizer] shall require the charter school to set 
enrollment targets that ensure the charter school provides equity of 
access for at-risk applicants to its kindergarten classes.”129  Put simply, 
charter schools can still manipulate student demographics by using a 
                                                                                                                 
 126. Civil Rights Complaint, supra note 19, at 7, 17, 22–23; see also Type 3 Charter 
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uploads/2012/10/2011-Executed-Operating-Agreement-Hynes.pdf (allowing 
neighborhood preferences); Type 3 Charter School Operating Agreement Between 
Advocates For Arts-Based Education Corporation and The Orleans Parish School 
Board (2011), available at http://www.opsb.us/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/2011-
Executed-Operating-Agreement-Lusher.pdf.  No RSD charter has chosen to utilize 
neighborhood preferences. THE COWEN INST., CASE STUDIES OF SCHOOL CHOICE 
AND OPEN ENROLLMENT IN FOUR CITIES 4 (2011), available at http://www.cowen
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 128. Dreilinger, OneApp Serves 5,000 Families in Summer Enrollment, supra note 
105. 
 129. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, §2711(B) (2014). 
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preference for their tuition paying preschool students, but the 
practice must be approved and is somewhat circumscribed. 
These continuing barriers to equitable access led local and national 
organizations to file a complaint alleging discriminatory educational 
practices in violation of Titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act with 
the Department of Justice and the Office of Civil Rights in May of 
2014.130  It contains two claims: (1) African-American students are 
subject to school closures at a much higher rate than white students; 
and (2) the state discriminates against African-American students by 
failing to provide adequate educational alternatives for students in 
recently closed schools.131  The allegation is essentially that the RSD 
closes traditional, direct-run schools that are almost one hundred 
percent African-American at much higher rates than similarly 
performing schools with high percentages of white students.132  It then 
discriminates, according to the Complaint, against the African-
American students from the closed schools “by implementing a 
confusing and biased enrollment system and by blindly allowing 
charter and OPSB public schools to institute admissions 
criteria . . . that disproportionately affect and exclude African-
American students.”133  The Complaint asked the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) to prevent the closing of the last five RSD direct-run 
schools and to put a moratorium on charter renewals, neither of 
which happened.134 
While the state considered the Complaint “a joke” and political 
maneuvering by teachers’ unions,135 the DOJ has opened an 
investigation, and the RSD has officially responded to the 
Complaint.136  It is highly unlikely that the DOJ will find any civil 
                                                                                                                 
 130. See Civil Rights Complaint, supra note 19.  Simultaneous complaints, with 
similar allegations, were filed in New Orleans, Chicago, and Newark—all school 
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Dreilinger, New Orleans Charter Civil Rights Complaint ‘a Joke’, supra note 8. 
 131. Civil Rights Complaint, supra note 19, at 21–23. 
 132. Id. at 21–22. 
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rights violations in the school closing and OneApp process.137  A 
federal district court recently rejected similar claims of discrimination 
based on school closures in Washington, D.C.138  It held: 
Few topics, understandably, incite our passions more than the 
education of our children.  Toss into the mix the future of 
neighborhood institutions, whose familiarity and history may 
resonate deeply, and quite a volatile brew emerges.  It is thus hardly 
surprising that assorted constituencies may possess varied opinions 
on the wisdom and necessity of the Plan and . . . strategy.  Yet every 
adverse policy decision does not yield a constitutional claim.  In this 
case, there is no evidence whatsoever of any intent to discriminate 
on the part of Defendants, who are actually transferring children out 
of weaker, more segregated, and under-enrolled schools.  The 
remedy Plaintiffs seek—i.e., to remain in such schools—seems 
curious, given that these are the conditions most people typically 
endeavor to escape.139 
But the fact that the admissions process continues to produce 
skewed school demographics that are directly tied to school quality, 
combined with the racially charged history of post-Katrina school 
reform, means that allegations of access inequality will persist. 
In sum, for seven years after Katrina, access to schools was a 
decentralized, uncoordinated, logistical nightmare for parents.  This 
significantly contributed to the balkanization of the schools by race, 
socioeconomic status, and academic ability, because the most 
motivated and able parents were able to secure favorable placements 
for their children, leaving parents without resources or time for the 
dregs of the system.  And with little to no oversight, charter schools 
were able to massage student enrollments through a variety of 
practices.  It is no surprise that during this time fewer poor African-
American parents believed their children were enrolled in their first 
choice schools than did white parents.140 
It was only in year eight, through a concerted and coordinated 
effort to centralize admissions through OneApp, that many of these 
problems were addressed, if not yet solved.141  Without this 
                                                                                                                 
 137. OCR has resolved forty-two of seventy-six complaints alleging racially 
discriminatory changes but has required systemic changes in only one case. 
Dreilinger, U.S. Education Department Opens Civil Rights Investigation of New 
Orleans Public School Closures, supra note 136. 
 138. Smith v. Henderson, 944 F. Supp. 2d 89 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 139. Id. at 93. 
 140. See THE COWEN INST., 2008 REPORT, supra note 60, at 15. 
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centralization, the schools would certainly be even more stratified by 
race, socioeconomic status, and ability.  A critical lesson from New 
Orleans is that equal access demands a unified enrollment process 
overseen by a centralized authority.  The system is far from perfect—
circumscribing opportunities for students based on their place of 
residence, academic abilities, or capacity to pay for preschool can 
never achieve access equity or claim to be truly a free choice 
system142—but it is a vast improvement over the previous 
decentralized system of enrollment. 
2. Retention Equity 
A common complaint against charter schools nationwide is that 
they utilize suspension and expulsion to push out students who are 
difficult to educate.143  Enrolling at-risk and difficult students with bad 
behavior is risky for charter schools, whose very survival depends on 
high test scores and graduation rates.144  One easy way to solve this 
problem is to cull these challenging students from their student bodies 
through suspension or expulsion.  To this point, a nationwide study 
found that charter schools had overly harsh discipline policies.145  This 
is certainly true in New Orleans, where many charter schools have 
adopted strict behavior policies with drastic consequences.146  During 
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the first seven years after Katrina, students were routinely expelled 
for minor offenses, such as uniform violations or carrying a cigarette 
lighter, and provided little to no due process.147  This led to a high 
attrition rate in New Orleans schools, as many schools suspended, 
expelled, or transferred tough students, though precise data was hard 
to collect because there was no centralized student tracking.148 
The problem became so acute that students staged sit-ins and 
protests at several schools, challenging their harsh suspension and 
expulsion practices.149  The dissatisfaction culminated in students, 
parents, and advocates filing a complaint with the Louisiana 
Department of Education, the Office of Civil Rights, and the 
Department of Justice in April of 2014, alleging that certain schools 
are “based on a harsh and punitive discipline culture . . . [that] 
endanger[s] the safety and welfare of students, violates students’ 
rights under state and federal laws [and] push[es] students out of 
school for minor infractions . . . .”150  Suspension rates in the named 
schools ranged from thirty-eight to sixty-eight percent.151  The state 
has placed on hold the investigation of the Complaint.152 
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The Complaint is an attack on the foundations of “no excuses” 
schools—behavior modification training and zero tolerance.153  The 
ready defense of schools is that they are entitled to determine which 
offenses should be punishable, and that if parents do not like it, they 
can choose a school with less strict codes of conduct.154  This 
exemplifies the current state of education in New Orleans—if you 
don’t like a particular practice, simply choose another school.  The 
full range of schools exists, according to this theory, which permits 
parents who approve of tough discipline to select these schools and 
the parents who oppose harsh discipline to select other schools.  
Charter advocates take the position that parent choice, not school 
practice, is the primary form of accountability in a system of 
schools.155 
New Orleans has only partially embraced this ideology when it 
comes to suspension and expulsion.  In 2012, the RSD created a 
centralized expulsion review board to prevent the alleged pushing out 
of unwanted students.156  All RSD schools and OPSB direct-run 
schools now utilize the same expulsion policies and procedures that 
are processed through the RSD Student Hearing Office.157  The RSD 
also created a unified list of expellable offenses that RSD charter 
schools must follow, thus ensuring that minor offenses would not lead 
to expulsion.158  All RSD schools and OPSB direct-run schools must 
utilize this policy, while OPSB charter schools are exempt from its 
guidelines.159  This was a rare instance of cooperation between the 
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RSD and the OPSB, and it shows the evolution of the RSD from 
granting complete autonomy to its charter schools to now retaining 
some centralized control over policies and practices.160 
But the OPSB and the RSD still refuse to control all aspects of 
student retention, as there are no plans to centralize suspension 
policies and practices.  The line is drawn between suspension and 
expulsion, according to the RSD, because expulsions affect the entire 
school system whereas suspensions do not, and charter schools need 
to retain autonomy over internal discipline.161  Of course suspensions 
can be long enough to have the same deleterious effect as expulsions 
for students.162  This is a real danger in a city that has an “absurd” rate 
of suspensions: one quarter of schools have suspended more than 
twenty percent of their students in a school year.163 The centralized 
expulsion system is not perfect, as schools still counsel-out difficult 
students, but “ever since the city started a centralized expulsion 
system last fall, more students are being formally expelled, rather 
than informally ejected.”164 Despite the shortcomings, the 
centralization of expulsion policy and hearings is certainly better than 
leaving these decisions in the hands of autonomous school operators, 
and it is being mimicked by several cities with large charter school 
sectors.165 
The RSD and the OPSB also worked together to ensure a quality 
alternative placement while students were serving their expulsions.166  
In a traditional school district made predominately of schools run 
directly by the school board with only a couple of charter schools, the 
direct-run schools often end up as the repositories for expelled 
students.  This was certainly the case in New Orleans when the RSD 
was running schools directly between 2006 and 2013.  The RSD 
direct-run schools became the dumping grounds for the unruly and 
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difficult students that had been kicked out of charter schools.167  
Knowing that there would be no more direct-run schools, the RSD 
and OPSB created the Crescent Leadership Academy—a special 
charter school that would cater to suspended and expelled students.168 
The solution to preventing schools from massaging enrollments 
through student retention policies was the same solution to achieving 
equitable access: centralization of services and unification of 
policies.169  And just as OneApp does not apply to all schools (OPSB) 
or all practices (selective admissions), the centralized expulsion 
hearings and unified expulsion rules do not apply to all schools or to 
any school’s suspensions.170  Unification and centralization in access 
and retention policies push up against political and autonomy 
barriers. The tension between centralization and 
specialization/autonomy is a recurring theme in the quest for 
retention equality in the New Orleans system of schools. 
3. Choice 
Much more is at work than just admission and retention policies 
leading to racially and socioeconomically skewed school enrollments.  
What is often ignored in this discussion is that many schools are 
designed for poor and minority students.  For example, Knowledge is 
Power Program (KIPP) schools, of which there are ten in New 
Orleans, were founded on the belief that demographically challenging 
students could be educated in a segregated environment.171  These 
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schools accept the fact that racial and socioeconomic isolation exist—
indeed public schools are more segregated by race than at the time of 
Brown172—and implement a curriculum and methodology designed to 
provide a high level education to these demographically challenging 
students in their racially and socioeconomically isolated schools.173  
The “no excuses” model of education174 created by KIPP, and popular 
in many other New Orleans charter schools,175 appeals to many 
African-American students but is a turn-off to middle and upper class 
white parents.176  “Because many choice schools seek to serve a 
particular population, their designs influence [racial and 
socioeconomic] demographics.”177  Sci Academy—one of the schools 
with the harshest discipline policies and a strict “no excuses” 
approach—is the third most popular school in the city for ninth 
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graders.178  The New Orleans system of specialized schools allows 
parents to choose segregation, and many parents are making this 
choice. 
In addition, the uncomfortable truth may be that the old proverb 
“birds of a feather flock together” is correct: 
[Nationwide e]thnic self-segregation is evident among many charter 
school populations.  These trends are not due to white flight from 
charters, but to white, black, Native American, and Latino parents 
who choose schools based more on their racial composition than on 
the relative academic quality of the charter school.  Parents often 
seek charter schools with a majority of students from their own race, 
schools that often have lower test scores than the school their 
children exit.179 
Whites choose to remain in schools with a majority of whites180—it 
is no surprise that minorities would choose to do the same. 
The parents provide the demand while foundation funding ensures 
an adequate supply of specialized schools focused on the poor and 
minorities.  The large influx of foundation money to New Orleans 
charter schools creates incentives to keep schools socioeconomically 
segregated because the foundations are reticent to give money to 
schools with significant populations of middle- and high-income 
students.181  In the New Orleans school market, the supply of “no 
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excuses” schools is fostered by private donations, while the demand is 
primarily from black and low-income parents.182 
It is impossible to ignore that school design and parent choice play 
a large role in the racial and socioeconomic disparity among 
schools.183  The inherent nature of an all-choice system of schools 
permits, if not exacerbates, segregation because it “facilitate[s] 
parents’ ability to dissent not just in word but in action against 
integration.”184  As Professor Osamudia Jones puts it,  
A turn to affinity charters or charter schools that are increasingly 
segregated may be the embrace of racial isolation as a virtue rather 
than a vice . . . .  School choice plans only compound the de facto 
segregation that makes American public schools more segregated 
now than they were at the time of Brown v. Board of Education.185 
B. Equity for Students with Disabilities 
Charter schools nationwide are accused of not properly educating 
students with disabilities.186  They have long been blamed for denying 
admission to students with disabilities, “cherry-picking” students with 
mild disabilities, providing a one-size-fits-all program instead of a full 
continuum of placements, failing to follow proper disciplinary 
procedures, and failing to identify students as disabled.187  These 
accusations are particularly strong in New Orleans.188 
There are numerous stories of students with disabilities being 
denied admission to charter schools or being “counseled out”—
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convinced that the charter school could not serve their needs.189  
These practices are clear violations of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504), and the 
Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA).190  The data 
corroborates the anecdotal evidence.  In 2010, charter schools 
educated sixty percent of the public school students in New Orleans, 
but enrolled only thirty-eight percent of the students with autism, 
thirty-seven percent of the students with severe emotional 
disturbances, and twenty-three percent of the students with multiple 
disabilities.191  Most of the students with disabilities were in the RSD 
direct-run schools, which were the “schools of last resort” and worst 
performing schools in the city.192  Even with the elimination of RSD 
direct-run schools, special education enrollment across school types 
continues to vary widely.  The student populations in the BESE and 
OPSB charter schools—the highest performers in the city—include 
only between three to five percent of special education students, well 
below the city average.  Every school rated A by the state has below 
average special education enrollments.193  The RSD charter schools—
most of which were formerly run directly by the RSD—enroll 9.4% 
special education students, the same as the citywide average.194 
There are several explanations for why charter schools turn away 
students with disabilities.  First is the pressure to produce results on 
standardized tests in order to maintain the charter.  Accountability 
requirements create strong incentives to deny admission to these 
lower performing students.195  Second, the high costs of educating 
students with disabilities also provide a strong incentive to deny 
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admission.  Students with disabilities put a large strain on the budgets 
of charter schools and can threaten their viability, particularly charter 
schools that are their own LEAs and thus lack economies of scale.196  
In a traditional LEA—with numerous schools—paraprofessionals, 
psychologists, special education directors, and other necessary 
personnel can be used across many schools with the costs spread out 
evenly amongst them.  In a system of schools where most charter 
schools are independent LEAs—essentially one-school school 
districts—it is too expensive to hire the necessary personnel to assist 
with what may amount to only a few students.197 
Finally, and maybe most importantly, special education often runs 
contrary to the mission and culture of charter schools.  Many charter 
schools adopt a “hedgehog” approach to education: focus on one 
thing, and one thing only, in which to excel.  As one school leader put 
it, the school should have a: 
[S]ingle minded focus on student achievement.  If the school tried to 
do too much—provide health care classes or parenting services, for 
example—it risked failure on its core mission . . . in the same way 
that the fox’s myriad plots are no match for the hedgehog’s 
obsession with a single strategy.198 
If the single-minded focus is college preparation, or academic 
achievement, a student with disabilities, particularly severe ones that 
require different services, may not fit in that mold.  The school may 
feel that the student would not be well served and that accepting such 
students would divert its “hedgehog”-like, singular focus and degrade 
the quality of the program.  The specialized nature of charter schools 
combined with the “hedgehog” strategy often leads to excluding 
students with disabilities.199 
Charter schools are also uniquely challenged to fulfill their 
obligation to locate, identify, and evaluate students with disabilities 
under the IDEA.200  This “child find” obligation compels LEAs to 
identify and evaluate all students within their jurisdiction, but 
Louisiana law defines “jurisdiction” for charter schools as “the 
boundary of the educational facility.”201  In an all-charter school 
system where schools are compelled to identify only students within 
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their four walls, there is no mechanism in place to locate those 
disabled students outside the public school system as required by the 
IDEA.  “Because there is no centralized entity or authority 
responsible for child find across the city, children who are homeless, 
migrant, or simply not enrolled in public schools are not being found 
and evaluated in accordance with federal law.”202 
Charter schools also struggle to provide appropriate related 
services and specialized instruction in violation of the IDEA.203  The 
treatment of students with mental health issues and behavioral 
problems is emblematic of the challenges in serving these students in 
a decentralized system.  More children suffer from mental health 
issues in New Orleans than in any other part of the country.204  At the 
same time, the number of treatment facilities for these students has 
declined rapidly, and there is an extreme shortage of providers and 
facilities.205  The onus has fallen on the schools, more than ever, to 
either provide, or locate and pay for, proper treatment. 
This is proving extremely difficult because students with severe 
behavioral and mental health problems are particularly expensive and 
difficult to educate.  The prohibitive cost means some schools neglect 
mental health and counseling, and very few schools operate programs 
to address the needs of these students.206  The services once provided 
by a large multi-school LEA—the OPSB—now must be provided by 
single-school LEAs.  The central office for social work and counseling 
services no longer exists, leaving each charter school as an island to 
provide these services.207  “New Orleans has become a case study in 
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how children and families are affected by rapid decentralization of 
public education and mental health systems.”208  It is no surprise that 
the Charter Management Organizations that run numerous schools, 
and can benefit from economies of scale, have been the first charter 
schools able to create programs for students with severe emotional 
and behavioral issues.209 
The treatment of students with disabilities has improved over time, 
but much still needs to be done.210  The problems of identification, 
exclusion, and service provision are the subject of a class action 
litigation filed by the Southern Poverty Law Center in 2010.211  The 
Complaint did not target individual charter schools, but instead 
faulted the state and the RSD for failing in their statutorily mandated 
oversight duties under the IDEA and Section 504.212  The Complaint 
was not so much a call for action by charter schools as it was a call for 
action by the state, the RSD, and the OPSB to create order out of the 
chaos resulting from a decentralized special education system.213 
The OPSB and the RSD recognized these problems and are 
pursuing two separate avenues to address them.  The first is 
centralizing certain aspects of special education.  In March of 2014, 
the OPSB and the RSD entered into a Cooperative Endeavor 
Agreement (CEA) to ensure shared responsibilities for programs 
targeted to high needs students, including students with disabilities.214  
Under the CEA, the OPSB and the RSD agree to open citywide 
therapeutic programs by 2015-16 to address the shortage in the 
private sector and within schools.215  In addition, the CEA creates a 
citywide exceptional needs fund to help schools with the costs of 
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serving students with the highest needs.216  The CEA also divides up 
responsibility for certain legal obligations for which it was difficult to 
ascertain responsibility in a decentralized system of schools.  The 
CEA clarifies that the OPSB will be responsible for “child find” for 
all students not within public schools, including preschools.217  The 
OPSB will provide special education services to preschool students, 
and the parties will work together to place preschool students 
identified as disabled.  The OPSB also committed to providing all 
special education services to students in private schools.218  Finally, in 
the 2015-16 school year, the RSD will be piloting a project to ensure 
students receive out of school mental health services.219 
The importance of the CEA cannot be overstated—not only for 
the services it will provide to students with disabilities, but also for the 
ground-shaking paradigm shift it represents in New Orleans.  For nine 
years after the storm, there was neither coordination nor oversight of 
special education services—an area of education that practically 
demands centralized planning and economies of scale.220  Instead, it 
was expected, or more likely hoped, that the market of school choice 
would fill any unmet demand.  The recognition by the OPSB and the 
RSD that the unregulated system of schools would not step in to 
serve the needs of students with disabilities, and that oversight and 
centralization were necessary, was a major breakthrough in their 
relationship and a major break from the post-Katrina model.221 
But it is not a clean break.  There is still hope that specialized 
schools designed to meet the demands of students with disabilities 
will spring out of the decentralized system.  There are efforts to create 
entire schools for children with mental or behavioral health needs.222  
The OPSB recently approved a charter application for a school that 
specializes in serving students with reading disabilities such as 
dyslexia, and another is being planned to serve students with 
emotional needs.223  This follows a nationwide trend of creating 
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specialized schools for students with disabilities.  There are over one 
hundred charter schools across the country focused exclusively on 
special education students, and their popularity is growing.224  Parents 
often select the disability focused charter schools because their 
specialization results in better services to their children. 
New Orleans has steadily improved access, retention, and service 
provision for students with disabilities in the last couple of years.  It 
has done so by centralizing services for students who need it and 
plans on specializing schools for students who want it. 
C. Equity for English Language Learners 
The growth in the number of English Language Learner (ELL) 
students is being felt in many charter schools nationwide because 
federal civil rights laws mandate that charter schools both identify 
ELLs and provide them with effective education.225  This challenge is 
on full display in New Orleans, where there has recently been a large 
influx of non-native English speakers, particularly of Central 
American and Vietnamese students.  This puts tremendous strain on 
a charter school system ill-prepared to serve these students.226 
A recent survey by the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) and 
VAYLA (Vietnamese American Young Leaders Association) found 
that the enrollment and registration practices of more than half of the 
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city’s public schools “violate federal law and discourage enrollment of 
immigrant children and families.”227  The lack of translated 
enrollment documents and services is also prevalent.228  The 
Vietnamese Young Leaders of New Orleans filed a complaint with 
the Department of Justice and the Office of Civil Rights against the 
RSD, the OPSB, and independent charter operators alleging that the 
failure of charter schools to provide interpretation and translation 
services, and important information in a language that could be 
understood by non-native speakers, violated Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act by discriminating on the basis of national origin.229  The 
parties reached a Resolution Agreement wherein the schools agreed 
to provide the requested document translation and translation 
services.230 
But translation services are the minimum legal requirement; 
schools are compelled to take “appropriate action” to educate ELL 
students,231 and that has proven to be a challenge.  ELL students are 
the most unevenly distributed of the vulnerable student populations 
in New Orleans.  During the 2011–12 school year, 45% of the schools 
in the system had no ELL students, 50% had between 1% and 10%, 
and four schools had an ELL population of 15% or higher.232  The 
likely reason for this vast disparity in numbers is because only a small 
number of schools have the capacity and programs to educate ELL 
students, and parents flock to those programs.233 
The concentration of ELL students into a limited number of 
schools will continue so long as ELL programs remain uncoordinated 
and decentralized.234  Much like special education, provision of ELL 
                                                                                                                 
 227. Kari Dequine Harden, N.O. Public Schools Accused of Allegedly Violating 
Federal Law, LA. WKLY. (Oct. 20, 2014), http://www.louisianaweekly.com/n-o-public-
schools-accused-of-allegedly-violating-federal-law/. 
 228. Danielle Dreilinger, Most New Orleans Public School Registration Forms 
May Have Discouraged Immigrants, Report Says, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 15, 2014, 
http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/10/most_new_orleans_public_school_2
.html. 
 229. Complaint, Asian Am. L. Def. & Educ. Fund, Discrimination Against 
National Origin Minority Students and Parents Who Are Limited English (LEP) in 
Orleans Parish School Board (OPSB) and Recovery School District (RSD) Schools 
(Aug. 2, 2013), http://aaldef.org/VAYLA%20AALDEF%20DOJ%20OCR%20
Complaint.pdf. 
 230. Resolution Agreement (No. 06131645), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/docs/investigations/more/06131645-b.pdf. 
 231. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (2012). 
 232. THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 11. 
 233. See Dreilinger, Jump in Central American Immigrants, supra note 226. 
 234. See THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 11; Dreilinger, Jump in 
Central American Immigrants, supra note 226. 
654 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLII 
services is expensive and requires a high level of expertise that is 
difficult to achieve in a one-school LEA.  ELL students stretch 
resources, and the added cost is not covered by federal or state 
money.235  This makes it difficult, if not impossible, to create an 
effective ELL program in a single school that serves a limited number 
of ELL students.236  Like special education, the schools with the best 
ELL programs are part of charter networks that can leverage their 
budgets and services across numerous schools.237  Because most 
schools lack such services,238 parents are understandably drawn to the 
schools with any programs, creating a vicious circle of concentration 
of ELL students into a limited number of schools. 
Despite commentators recognizing the growing need for the shared 
services of an outside agency to offer ELL to students in the various 
charter schools, it is not occurring.239  No mention of ELL services 
exists in the CEA, and there is no indication that the OPSB and the 
RSD are willing to work together to ensure ELL services are 
provided in each school instead of only in select schools. 
Rather, the opposite approach is being taken, and specialization, 
rather than centralization, seems to be the route currently being 
pursued to ensure equality for ELL students.  OPSB recently 
approved a new charter school, Foundation Prep, to cater to the ELL 
needs of the immigrant population in New Orleans East.240  The 
school was approved, in part, because it met “the needs of the 
targeted community.”241  Unlike access, retention, and special 
education, where some centralization of planning and service 
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coordination is occurring, ELL service provision, up to this point, has 
been left to the system of schools to address unmet demand. 
III.  THE IMPACT OF MOVING TO A SYSTEM OF SCHOOLS ON 
EQUITY 
Achieving equality for vulnerable students after Katrina has been 
an ongoing struggle in New Orleans.  Equal educational opportunity 
was practically non-existent for vulnerable students during the first 
seven years when there was virtually no equality of access and little to 
no oversight over retention, special education, or ELL policies.  The 
decentralized and loosely monitored system of schools created a 
balkanized system, with the needs of vulnerable students often left 
unmet.  Parent choice also played a role in the concentration of 
students by abilities, class, and race, though parent choice was, and 
continues to be, circumscribed. 
The two most powerful educational entities in town—the OPSB 
and the RSD—did not centralize any services until 2012, when access 
was mostly unified through OneApp, and expulsions were unified 
through the expulsion review board and policy.  In 2014, with 
execution of the CEA, services were centralized for special education 
services, but at the same time specialized schools for students with 
disabilities and ELLs were opened.  New Orleans’s dual approach to 
ensuring equity—centralizing and unifying services for all schools on 
the one hand while encouraging specialized schools to meet unmet 
demands of vulnerable students on the other—brings to the fore a 
debate that has occurred in education reform for two decades: how to 
define educational equity. 
A. Centralized Planning or the “Invisible Hand” 
New Orleans is the first city to stand at the precipice of deciding 
how best to ensure equity in a virtually all-charter school system.  
One route relies on centralized planning, coordination, and resource 
sharing to ensure each school provides equal access and education to 
all types of students.  This is the accepted version of equality 
employed by schools since the Supreme Court uttered its most 
important phrase in the twentieth century: “separate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal.”242  Brown was about anti-
subordination and inclusion.243  This inclusion view of equality 
requires each school to serve students of all races and abilities. 
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Nearly every civil rights statute in the field of education is founded 
on this principle.  Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits 
segregation “in the schools of the local educational agencies of any 
State.”244  The Equal Education Opportunity Act of 1974 prohibits 
“segregation by an educational agency of students on the basis of 
race, color, or national origin among or within schools . . . .”245  The 
IDEA allows “separate schooling . . . only when the nature or severity 
of the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with 
the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved 
satisfactorily.”246  The Americans With Disabilities Act and Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act similarly require schools to educate 
students with disabilities in inclusive settings with general education 
students rather than in separate schools.247 
The inclusion view of equality, which has endured for over sixty 
years, demands that every school attempt to educate every type of 
student regardless of ability, aptitude, behavior, race, or 
socioeconomic status.  It requires massive coordination and 
economies of scale, especially to provide appropriate integrated 
services for ELLs, students with disabilities, and students that are 
particularly challenging.248 
A few signs point to New Orleans pursuing inclusion equality 
through collective planning and centralized control: creation of 
OneApp, centralizing expulsions, and execution of the CEA.  The 
RSD and the OPSB came to recognize the importance of cooperation 
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and systemic planning to achieve equity249 and that the services for 
truants, special education students, and all at-risk youth were 
“scattershot, overlapping, or non-existent.”250  But it remains to be 
seen whether these are the first steps towards more centralization to 
ensure equality or merely a stop-gap measure until the system can 
create a thick “portfolio”251 of autonomous and specialized schools to 
meet the unique demands of each student in the system.  Even though 
the RSD no longer directly operates any schools, and is instead 
focusing on oversight of its charter schools and managing centralized 
services in New Orleans,252 all signs point to the current centralization 
acting as a bridge to a more fully functioning decentralized system. 
First, it is unlikely that one unified or even cooperative governance 
structure will exist in New Orleans for a very long time.  The OPSB 
will not be granted its wish that all schools return to its control and 
the RSD cease operations in New Orleans.253  The OPSB asked the 
legislature to compel return of high performing RSD schools to its 
control but was rebuffed.  Instead, the legislature gave each school a 
choice of whether to stay with the RSD or move to the OPSB, and 
even upon such a return, it would allow them to retain their LEA 
status.254  Only two schools have elected to return to OPSB control, 
and it is doubtful that many more will.255  In fact, there may be 
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movement the other way—from OPSB control to state control—
because, as of 2012, if OPSB charters do not like how they are treated 
by the OPSB they can petition to change to a charter under state 
control.256 
Because of its failure to regain the schools via the legislature, the 
OPSB sought the help of the courts.  This approach also failed, as the 
Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the OPSB’s lawsuit seeking return 
of all schools to its control in March of 2014.257  Despite the original 
intent of the RSD to be a stopgap measure to turn around schools and 
then return them to local control,258 it is now a permanent fixture in 
New Orleans.259 
Because the RSD will not be displaced, cooperation between the 
OPSB and the RSD is necessary to achieve any centralized planning.  
Execution of the CEA is one step in this direction, but promising to 
do something and actually doing it are two very different things.  
Even after execution of the CEA, the OPSB and the RSD have 
fought more than cooperated.260  The two parties continue to battle 
                                                                                                                 
13/more-charter-schools-now-eligible-to-join-orleans-parish-school-board-but-will-
anyone-take-the-leap/ (stating that Charter school operators are wary “of becoming 
part of a dysfunctional local school system” plagued by a feuding school board); 
Williams, New Orleans Public Schools Have Seen Successes, Challenges in Past Year, 
New Report Says, supra note 13 (“There is little desire (by charter schools) to return 
to the system of governance that previously existed.”). 
 256. 2012 Act 2 (codified as amended at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 17:3983(B)(2)). 
 257. Danielle Dreilinger, New Orleans’ State Takeover Schools Need Not Return 
to Local Control, Court Says, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 1, 2014, http://www.nola.com/
education/index.ssf/2014/04/new_orleans_state_takeover_sch.html. 
 258. DEBRA VAUGHAN ET AL., COWEN INST., TRANSFORMING PUBLIC EDUCATION 
IN NEW ORLEANS: THE RECOVERY SCHOOL DISTRICT 2003–2011 1, available at 
http://www.coweninstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/History-of-the-RSD-
Report-2011.pdf (“Intended as a mechanism for restructuring and reform, the RSD 
was never meant to be a permanent part of the public school governance landscape in 
New Orleans.  Instead, the RSD was meant to take control of and turn around 
chronically failing schools for an initial period of five years.  After that time, and 
assuming adequate school improvement, schools would be released from the 
jurisdiction of the RSD and returned to their local school board.  Chartering schools 
became a strategy used by the RSD even before Katrina.  In 2010, BESE approved a 
plan that allowed for the gradual transfer of some schools back to local control.  As 
of 2011, the majority of schools in Orleans Parish are charter schools authorized by 
BESE under the auspices of the RSD, with the remainder being traditionally 
operated public schools directly run by the RSD and the OPSB and charter schools 
authorized by the OPSB.”); Bryant, supra note 10; Dreilinger, What’s the Point of the 
Recovery School District Now?, supra note 253. 
 259. Dreilinger, What’s the Point of the Recovery School District Now?, supra 
note 253. 
 260. Kari Dequine Harden, Charter School Votes to Return to OPSB Governance, 
LA. WKLY. (Dec. 14, 2014), http://www.louisianaweekly.com/charter-school-votes-to-
return-to-opsb-governance/ (explaining that OPSB recently considered suing RSD 
2015] THE VIEW FROM NEW ORLEANS 659 
over return of physical buildings from the RSD to the OPSB in spite 
of the CEA’s promised cooperation.261  The OPSB and the RSD still 
make decisions independent of one another, and ultimate unified 
governance seems unlikely, if not impossible.262 
The second factor indicating that New Orleans is heading towards 
decentralization is that centralized services and unified planning run 
contrary to a fundamental underpinning of charter schools: site-level 
autonomy.  The charter movement is founded upon freedom from 
regulations regarding budget, curriculum, and personnel.263  
Autonomy and independence are the hallmarks of charter schools, 
and the charters in New Orleans have fought tooth and nail to retain 
them.  If the RSD and the OPSB fail to cooperate moving into the 
future, the system of schools—those sixty-three LEAs and forty-four 
independent school boards—will certainly not seek service 
centralization or uniformity that infringe on autonomy.  As stated by 
one of the most public and staunch charter supporters in New 
Orleans, Neerav Kingsland, “[t]he ultimate goal of the New Orleans 
public education system is not uniformity: it is diversity.  And to 
misunderstand this is to misunderstand the fundamental design 
principle of our system.”264 
Finally, it appears that the state legislature is expecting Charter 
Management Organizations, or CMOs, (non-profit organizations that 
operate multiple charter schools) to fill the centralized planning 
gap.265  CMOs educate over half the students in New Orleans.266  
CMOs are not LEAs in the legal sense, but they often act like them in 
the practical sense, spreading costs and resources across the many 
schools they operate.  The state has great confidence in CMOs, as 
seen by recent legislation making chartering easier for large CMOs 
with proven records of success.267  It is unknown if the state believes 
                                                                                                                 
about school openings and the relationship remains tense); Dreilinger, In Move 
Towards Cooperation, supra note 53. 
 261. Dreilinger, Orleans Parish School Board Votes to Ask for Return of John 
McDonough High, supra note 223; Danielle Dreilinger, With John McDonough, All 
New Orleans’ Takeover Schools Are on the Line, Supporters Say, TIMES-PICAYUNE, 
Sept. 12, 2014, http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2014/09/with_john_
mcdonogh_all_new_orl.html. 
 262. Ayers, supra note 3; see THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 4 
(positing that long term shared governance seems unlikely). 
 263. Garda, Special Education in Charter Schools, supra note 186, at 663–66. 
 264. Kingsland, supra note 178. 
 265. 2012 Act 2 (codified as amended at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 17:3983(3)(d)). 
 266. THE COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 8. 
 267. 2012 Act 2 (codified as amended at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 17:3983(3)(d)) 
(permitting successful schools meeting automatic renewal guidelines to open operate 
660 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLII 
that CMO centralized planning and service provision for the schools 
they control act as an adequate substitute for system-wide services, 
but it seems to be leaning that direction. 
With cross-district and cross-school cooperation unlikely, it 
appears New Orleans is relying exclusively on the invisible hand of 
the market education system to create equity for at-risk students.268  
This model requires belief in outcome or empowerment equality 
rather than inclusion equality. 
While empowerment equality cannot necessarily be called “new”—
it is possible to read Brown as simply empowering African-Americans 
to choose schools that were previously cut-off to them instead of 
compelling integration—it did not gain traction until the 1990s with 
the advent of outcome accountability and charter schools.269  This 
concept of equality found its popular roots in the influential 
government report, A Nation at Risk, concluding that there was a 
“rising tide of [educational] mediocrity that threatens our very future 
as a Nation and a people.”270  The implied message was that twenty-
five years of striving for inclusion equality since Brown had yielded 
bad schools and that desegregation was mutually exclusive with 
quality.271 
In the push for improved performance during the decades that 
followed—the accountability and choice era—equality was 
repurposed from inclusion to outcomes and parental empowerment.  
When parents choose and student outcomes improve, the argument 
goes, equality is achieved irrespective of the demographics of the 
schools.  Inclusion equality essentially transformed into equal access 
to quality schools through choice, and many embrace choice and 
specialized educational environments as the new civil rights 
                                                                                                                 
two additional schools without a formal charter application); see also LA. ADMIN 
CODE tit. 126 § 523 (2012). 
 268. The free-market education theorists believe that the marketplace is the ideal 
way to allocate resources because each individual will be led by the invisible hand to 
the social maximum position. James, supra note 70, at 1093–95. 
 269. See Robert A. Garda, Jr., Coming Full Circle: The Journey from Separate but 
Equal to Separate and Unequal Schools, 2 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 26–31 
(2007). 
 270. NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., U.S. DEPT OF EDUC., A NATION AT 
RISK 1 (1983). 
 271. The implication is not true, as “the failures of integration have more to do 
with failures of implementation . . . than with the inherent failures of the concept of 
integration itself,” but the perception remains. James, supra note 70, at 1118. 
2015] THE VIEW FROM NEW ORLEANS 661 
movement.272  Separate but equal became separate and equal, 
propped up by increasing liberty through choice.273 
Many scholars argue that choice and equality cannot co-exist.  
Professor Osamudia James posits that “[i]f our goal is equality, then 
choice must be minimized,”274 while Professor Derek Black argues 
that the “individualized concept of education . . . lack[s] concern for 
equality[, and] inequality is a necessary ingredient to competition.”275  
While it is true that inclusion equality and unmitigated school choice 
are likely mutually exclusive, market-based reforms certainly can 
advance empowerment equality.  Even the staunchest opponents of 
choice recognize that “[i]n the abstract, choice can be an integral 
feature of law or policy that promotes equal rights and 
opportunities.”276 
New Orleans may become the manifestation of this new equality.  
Achieving inclusion equity requires planning and centralization, while 
                                                                                                                 
 272. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Augustine, America’s New Civil Rights Movement: 
Education Reform, Public Charter Schools and No Child Left Behind, 59 LA. B.J. 
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School Choice Is the Most Critical Civil Rights Issue of Our Time: It’s the Modern 
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http://dianeravitch.net/2013/12/02/julian-vasquez-heilig-why-school-choice-is-not-the-
civil-rights-issue-of-our-time/.  Even the NAACP has included choice and charter 
schools in its civil rights agenda. James, supra note 70, at 1099. 
 273. See, e.g., Derek W. Black, Education’s Elusive Future, Storied Past and the 
Fundamental Inequities Between, 46 GA. L. REV. 557, 562–71 (2012); Susan E. Eaton 
& Gary Orfield, Introduction to DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET 
REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION xiv (Gary Orfield & Susan E. Eaton 
eds., 1996); Garda, Jr., supra note 262, at 3–5; James, supra note 70, at 1115–16; 
Goodwin Liu, “History Will Be Heard”: An Appraisal of the Seattle/Louisville 
Decision, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 53, 73 (2008); Daniel J. Losen, Challenging 
Racial Disparities: The Promise and Pitfalls of the No Child Left Behind Act’s Race-
Conscious Accountability, 47 HOW. L.J. 243, 244 (2004); Saiger, supra note 142, at 50 
(“The choice debate, in many respects, instantiates the republic’s longstanding 
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 274. James, supra note 70, at 1128. 
 275. Black, supra note 183, at 459. 
 276. James, supra note 70, at 1133; see also Kiel, supra note 17, at 377 (noting that 
portfolio school districts are at high risk of creating separate and unequal schools). 
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empowerment equality only requires entities to act in their own self-
interest: parents choosing what is best for their children and schools 
specializing to meet their demands.  This appears to be where New 
Orleans is headed—not by conscious choice but by default, an 
inherent outcome of the fractured governance in a system of schools.  
As Professor Julie Mead points out: “If you set up a system based on 
market principles that are designed to allow schools to serve 
particular interests, then we’re going to get pockets of interest.”277 
This is already occurring in New Orleans.  There are a wide variety 
of schools catering to numerous different types of students from 
which parents can choose.278  In high school alone, parents can select 
from schools focused on foreign language fluency,279 exposure to 
college courses,280 college preparation, STEM (science, technology, 
engineering, and math) for traditionally underserved students,281 
STEM for select students,282 military and maritime studies,283 creative 
arts,284 and technical skills,285 as well as alternative schools designed 
for over-age and academically behind students,286 and a school 
                                                                                                                 
 277. Prothero, supra note 224. 
 278. SIMS & VAUGHAN, BEATING THE ODDS, supra note 13, at 8. But see THE 
COWEN INST., 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 29 (“The quality and diversity of choices 
may be limited.”); Waller, supra note 223 (explaining that there has been a 
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 279. E.g., INT’L HIGH SCH. NEW ORLEANS, http://www.ihsnola.org/about/ (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2015). 
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School (last visited Mar. 15, 2015). 
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(last visited Mar. 15, 2015). 
 284. E.g., Academic Studio, NOCCA, http://www.nocca.com/academic-studio/ (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2015). 
 285. E.g., Innovations in Education, FIRSTLINE SCH., http://www.firstline
schools.org/innovations-in-education.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2015) (“NOLA Tech 
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 286. See, e.g., RENEW ACCELERATED HIGH SCH., http://www.renewschools.org/
apps/pages/index.jsp?uREC_ID=182758&type=d&pREC_ID=457304 (last visited 
Mar. 152, 2015) (“ReNEW Accelerated High School . . . aims to push our most 
academically behind students by accelerating their graduation and becoming 
college ready.  The innovative program is one-of-a-kind in the city, providing our 
over-age, under-credited students the ability to accelerate their high school course 
work and earning a true High School Diploma.”); THE NET CHARTER HIGH SCH., 
http://thenetnola.org/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).  The NET is an alternative 
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exclusively for expelled students.287  As noted above, there will soon 
be a school for dyslexic students and one for ELL students, and a 
proposed school will specialize in addressing students with emotional 
needs.288  There are even schools that promise diversity—not because 
they believe that separate is inherently unequal, but merely that 
parent-chosen integration is a superior education model.289  The 
education market continues to “recognize gaps in the city’s 
educational landscape and launch schools to meet these needs.”290 
Moreover, the state is encouraging specialization.  The RSD is 
recruiting charter operators to fill unmet needs.291  The legislature is 
pushing for specialized charter operators as shown by their 
amendment to the charter-enabling statute in 2012 charging BESE 
with actively recruiting “chartering groups that offer a program of 
study or propose to offer a program of study that effectively addresses 
regional workforce needs, such as career and technical education, 
industry-based certifications, and vocational course work.”292  The 
charter accountability system was also changed to encourage 
specialized charter schools by allowing for “alternative evaluation” of 
charter schools serving “unique populations.”293 
Even when schools are not designed for specific student 
populations, the fact that few provide specialized services makes them 
popular for these types of students.  For example, word spread about 
Esperanza Charter School’s ELL program, which has induced more 
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 288. See Waller, supra note 223. 
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(last visited Mar. 15, 2015); MORRIS JEFF COMMUNITY SCHOOL, 
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 290. Jacobs, supra note 289.  There is also a school focused on computer literacy. 
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 291. See SIMS & VAUGHAN, BEATING THE ODDS, supra note 13, at 8. 
 292. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3981(8) (2012). 
 293. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, § 1103(B) (2014). 
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ELL students to apply.294  Any school that offers services for 
marginalized students can expect the same results.  Whether a school 
is designed specifically for a student population or simply attracts 
particularized groups by providing services that do not exist 
elsewhere, the end result is concentrated student populations. 
Of course, the current New Orleans schools are as far from 
achieving the new equality as the old New Orleans schools were from 
achieving inclusion equality.  There is a full-throated debate about 
whether choice models improve student outcomes or narrow 
achievement gaps.  Many believe school choice must be rejected 
because it will never achieve its promises.295  Others believe that 
inclusion equality also could not live up to its promises, and call for its 
abandonment.296  To some, “[t]he proper question is whether market 
based choice reduces equality relative to our already racialized and 
unequal system based upon geographic choice.”297 
But in New Orleans, where the new system is still finding itself, the 
problem should be considered in the abstract.  It is critical that the 
city decide if it wants empowerment equality or inclusion equality.  
Putting aside issues of implementation and assuming either model can 
achieve all that it promises, which should New Orleans strive to 
achieve?  Inclusion equality promises diversity in schools; 
empowerment equality promises diversity of schools, but not within 
schools.  Without a concerted effort to centralize services, the system 
will march automatically towards empowerment equality. 
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B. Lessons from New Orleans 
In some respects, drawing lessons from New Orleans to apply in 
other cities is difficult because its path has been so unique.  While 
most major urban cities are slowly transitioning from a unified school 
system into a system of schools, New Orleans was catapulted into 
decentralization and is easing into centralization. 
Transferrable lessons are also hard to glean because, unlike every 
other school system, New Orleans is almost all charter schools.  
Traditional arguments about “opt-out” and inequality between 
charters and traditional schools simply do not exist in a system that 
has collectively opted-out of traditional governance.298  There are no 
traditional schools on which to rely to educate the most challenging 
students.  Instead of dumping difficult to educate students into the 
traditional schools, as happened in New Orleans directly after the 
storm and as occurs in many other cities, the charter system in New 
Orleans is now compelled to deal with them.  The debate in New 
Orleans, as opposed to the rest of the country, is not whether to have 
charter schools, or how many to have, but how to make them work 
equally for all. 
It is easy to argue that New Orleans is proof that equity cannot be 
found among decentralization, especially for vulnerable and 
subordinated groups.  The unrestrained system of schools for the first 
seven years after Katrina almost completely failed special education 
students, English language learners, the poor, and the powerless.  But 
such a conclusion, indeed any conclusion, from this time is too facile 
because the system was rebuilt virtually from scratch.  During this 
period the school system was still physically rebuilding from tragedy, 
and the students were emotionally rebuilding.299  While Katrina’s 
waters receded quickly, the schools swayed and rocked for years, only 
recently stabilizing.  The turbulence ebbed as the “portfolio” of 
schools grew, students found permanent schools, schools found 
permanent homes, and the RSD settled in.  Lessons transferrable to 
other cities are difficult to glean from this unique rebuilding era.  But 
a few things are certain. 
                                                                                                                 
 298. Many critiques of charter school and choice presume their coexistence with 
traditional school districts and are hard to translate when the system is almost 
entirely charter schools. See, e.g., Black, supra note 183; James, supra note 70. 
 299. Students in New Orleans are still suffering from high levels of Post-Traumatic 
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First, the free market of schools does not operate like a free market 
in all respects.  The reasons are many, but one critical reason 
displayed in New Orleans is that education consumers do not act 
rationally, or at least how economists expect them to act.300  Contrary 
to expectations, parents often keep their children in low-performing 
schools and do not initially select high-performing schools.  The 
behavior has been shown in New York301 and is certainly the case in 
New Orleans.302  Very few schools in the city, no matter how 
consistently poor-performing, have closed due to insufficient students 
or funds.303  Because market forces do not send poorly performing 
schools out of business, the chartering authorities are the primary 
agents closing charter schools in New Orleans.304 
With the government, more than market demand, controlling 
school quality, it is imperative that the charter authorization process 
be rigorous and the threat of closure meaningful.305  While this may 
not be happening nationally, it appears to be occurring in New 
Orleans, as a large majority of charter applications are denied and a 
dozen charters have been shut down by the state.306  Before 2008, 
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there were no charter revocations because of the intense politicization 
of closure decisions.307  The revocation process was de-politicized in 
2008, when the Louisiana Department of Education issued bright line 
renewal and revocation standards for the charters it oversaw.  This 
change insulated authorizers from outside pressures when making 
controversial revocation and renewal decisions.308  Accordingly, 
crystal rules for charter revocation and renewal are a critical 
component of any choice system. 
One important aspect of the free-market analogy remains true 
though: schools will specialize to meet unmet demands, and parents 
will often prefer specialized schools.  An ELL school was created 
because there were insufficient ELL services offered in the existing 
schools.  A special education school was created for the same reason.  
Future specialized schools will continue to crop up because of 
“market” forces and because the state is pushing for it.  Parents may 
not be selecting schools as an economist would expect them to—
based on school performance scores alone—but they are selecting 
them based on the “fit” between the school and the child.309  Left 
unchecked, specialized schools will flourish and many parents will 
select segregation. 
A second clear lesson is that a nascent, unrestrained system of 
autonomous schools will leave hard to educate students behind.  Once 
the education system became stable, the OPSB and RSD recognized 
that the loosely regulated system of schools produced winners and 
losers, which is unacceptable for public schooling.  Some level of 
centralization and planning is necessary to ensure equity when a 
majority of the charter schools are independent LEAs. 
In order to achieve this, the chartering authority must act in a 
planning and centralizing role, not merely an authorizing and 
oversight role, especially for authorizers of charter schools that are 
independent LEAs.  Charter authorizers traditionally review 
applications, approve charter schools, and then get out of the way 
until it is time to determine if the charter should be renewed or 
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revoked.  The National Alliance of Charter School Authorizers 
publishes what is considered the gold standard in authorizer practices, 
and none of these Essential Practices deal with provision of services 
or centralizing and planning for the system of schools.310  The RSD 
operated under this traditional standard for authorizers for the first 
seven years after Katrina, and gross inequities developed within the 
system.  It is only once the RSD and BESE expanded their role 
beyond mere authorizer and evaluator that the necessary centralized 
planning and services could begin. 
There is a nascent national trend for charters to partner with their 
authorizing school districts for resource sharing and planning, 
especially for special education.311  New Orleans is proof that such 
partnering is essential to ensure vulnerable populations are properly 
served.  This is why the Annenberg Institute calls for a unified school 
plan and minimum academic, social, and educational opportunities 
that all taxpayer funded schools should provide in a system of charter 
schools to ensure proper provision of specialized services.312  The 
authorizer is the best-positioned entity to provide this unification. 
Directly related, charter school autonomy must be circumscribed to 
allow the authorizer to control certain services centrally.  I have 
argued elsewhere that charter schools should not be permitted to be 
independent LEAs for special education purposes.313  The same 
argument would apply for ELL services as well.  Charter schools 
should be compelled to work with authorizers for provision of these 
key services that require economies of scale and high levels of 
expertise, at least until they prove they can provide these services 
independently.  Charters should have to earn their autonomy when it 
comes to serving vulnerable groups, rather than being granted it and 
waiting to see if they fail. 
A third important lesson—at least in districts where the state has 
taken over large swaths of schools—is that there must be either an 
exit strategy or a concrete division of responsibility between the state 
takeover district and the local school district.  Having two powerful 
school districts in one geographic area has proven contentious and 
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confusing in New Orleans.314  Uncertainty over how long the RSD 
would be present and when, and under what circumstances, schools 
would be returned to the OPSB inhibited by any centralized planning.  
There was no centralized planning in New Orleans until 2012, when it 
became apparent that the RSD was a permanent fixture.  Once the 
legislature would not compel the RSD to turn its schools back over to 
the OPSB, and no RSD charter would voluntarily submit to OPSB 
control, the OPSB realized the RSD was here to stay and that all the 
schools would inevitably become charter schools.  Only once the new 
system found firm footing was there any meaningful systemic 
planning, and that is when the education of vulnerable populations 
began to improve.  This problem could have been solved up front, 
with a specific and enumerated plan for return of schools to local 
control. 
It is also important that the exit and return plans hinge on the 
performance of the school board as well as the performance of the 
schools.  It defies common sense for a state to take a failing school 
from a district, turn it around to a high performing school, and then 
turn it back over to the district that mismanaged it in the first place.  
But this is precisely how most state takeover plans are conceived—as 
stopgap measures until the school is turned around.  It is much wiser 
to focus on the quality of the school and the quality of the return 
district.  This was proposed, and rejected, in New Orleans.  Instead, 
the decision has been left up entirely to the RSD charters on whether 
to return to the OPSB, and even if they return, they retain their 
independent LEA status.315  Most in the city agree that the elected 
school board, rather than the state, should be in charge of the schools, 
but the RSD charters will not voluntarily return to the OPSB because 
they believe it is incompetent, divided, and contentious.316  If specific 
and concrete school district performance benchmarks were created, 
just as specific and concrete school performance benchmarks exist, 
the return decision could be taken out of the hands of charter schools, 
and there would be a finite term on the state takeover school district. 
Finally, and maybe most importantly, the system as a whole must 
decide what type of equality it wants to pursue: inclusion equality, 
empowerment and outcome equality, or some mix of the two.  
Without deliberate planning, outcome equality becomes the default 
mode that inevitably grows out of decentralization.  Pursuit of 
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inclusion equality requires more planning and a conscious desire to 
pursue.  New Orleans never had the opportunity for such planning on 
the heels of Katrina and has still not engaged in meaningful, coherent 
dialogue on this critical question.  Without it, New Orleans is 
unwittingly choosing the outcome and specialization route to equality. 
CONCLUSION 
The charter school system in New Orleans is permanent and 
enduring.  Vested interests in the city, most importantly parents, 
strongly support choice and charter schools.317  The question in New 
Orleans is not whether to embrace or discard them, but how to ensure 
that they create equal educational opportunity within the system of 
schools. 
The New Orleans system of schools lacks a uniform vision for 
achieving equity for its most challenging students.  Without any single 
entity in control, there is no agreed-upon goal for where the system 
should stabilize.  One endpoint is achieving equality through a thick 
market of schools serving the unique needs of individual students.  
While the city is very far from a system of high-quality, specialized 
schools serving the needs of all students, including vulnerable ones, it 
is unclear whether this is the vision of equality New Orleans is trying, 
or even wants, to achieve.  But this is the method of achieving 
equality—concentrated and specialized—that New Orleans will fall 
into automatically because it happens by default, without planning, 
when parents and schools look after their own individual interests. 
If New Orleans seeks to achieve inclusion equality, where each 
school can serve every type of student, much work needs to be done.  
The OPSB and the RSD must put aside their differences and work 
together to create uniform policies and centralized services.  Charter 
schools must relinquish some of their cherished autonomy and accept 
that certain vulnerable students cannot be served properly in a single-
school LEA.  Coordination, cooperation, and unified vision must 
somehow be found in a decentralized system of schools. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 317. Ninety percent of parents think choice is important, while sixty-six percent 
believe schools have improved, and seventy-eight percent support charter schools. 
OSBORNE, supra note 5, at 10; see also Stephanie Grace, The Daily Beast 
Congratulates Mitch Landreiu on School Reform, GAMBIT WKLY. (Dec. 18, 2012), 
http://www.bestofneworleans.com/blogofneworleans/archives/2012/12/17/the-daily-
beast-congratulates-mitch-landrieu-on-school-reform (discussing how Mayor 
Landrieu champions charter schools). 
